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ZARIN V. COMMISSIONER REVISITED 
AND SOME METHODOLOGIES FOR 
DETERMINING COD INCOME 
PHILIP G. COHEN*
ABSTRACT
 The focus of this Article is a revisit of a very well-known and 
much written about Third Circuit Court of Appeals decision, Zarin 
v. Commissioner, concerning whether the taxpayer had COD income. 
Zarin dealt with whether a compulsive and unlucky gambler could 
avoid COD income when he settled with the casino for substan-
tially less than what he owed. Along with a plethora of diverse 
third-party assessments of the case, the judges who heard the case 
and its appeal were also divided. The Tax Court opinion was 
decided by an eleven to eight vote for the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS), with three separate dissenting opinions, and was followed 
by a Third Circuit reversal, with a two to one split of the judges. In 
a much-criticized decision, the divided Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reversed a split Tax Court and held that the hapless gam-
bler did not have discharge of indebtedness income. While many 
esteemed scholars have made plausible arguments to the contrary, 
this Article concludes that Zarin should have been determined to 
have COD income from his settlement with the casino. Zarin was 
not subject to tax when he received the gambling chips because 
both parties had an understanding it would be repaid. This tax 
benefit he received at the time of the loan resulted in COD income 
upon the indebtedness’ settlement for less than what was owed, 
unless an exception applied, and none should have in this case. 
* Professor of Taxation, Pace University Lubin School of Business; Retired 
Vice President–Tax & General Tax Counsel, Unilever United States, Inc.; BA 
New York University; JD Duke University School of Law; LL.M. (Labor Law 
& Taxation) New York University School of Law; MBA (Accounting) George 
Washington University. The author thanks Michael Schler and Professor Richard 
Kraus for their helpful comments on an earlier draft and his graduate teaching 
assistant, David Toto, for his assistance with this Article. All errors, omissions, 
and views, however, are only those of the author. 
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 This Article will also examine some of the theories for de-
termining if a taxpayer has COD income and how they relate to 
Zarin. The loan proceeds methodology, or a variation thereof, is 
the proper means of establishing whether a taxpayer has COD in-
come, prior to considering whether any of the exceptions apply. 
The freeing of assets and the Kerbaugh-Empire form of the whole 
transaction approaches should no longer be followed by the courts. 
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INTRODUCTION
 Among the litany of items specifically listed as included in 
gross income in section 61 is “[i]ncome from the discharge of in-
debtedness.”1 This is commonly referred to by the acronym COD, 
short for cancellation of debt income. Section 1082 further ad-
dresses income from the discharge of indebtedness, including 
providing for several exclusions.3 Most of the exclusions require, 
as a quid pro quo, a reduction of favorable tax attributes.4 Thus, 
often when section 108 applies, the taxpayer achieves a deferral 
rather than a permanent tax benefit.5 As observed by one scholar, 
“[t]he determination of whether a taxpayer must include a dis-
charge of indebtedness in gross income requires ... a two-part 
analysis. It must first be determined whether gross income con-
ceptually exists pursuant to an analysis under section 61.”6 As-
suming that this “results in a determination that gross income does 
in fact exist, it must then be determined whether any portion of 
such amount may be excluded from gross income under section 
108 ... [or a non-statutory exclusion].”7 The focus of this Article 
is a revisit of a very well-known and much written about Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals decision,8 Zarin v. Commissioner,9 con-
cerning whether the taxpayer had COD income. 
1 I.R.C. § 61(a)(12). 
2 I.R.C. § 108. 
3 An examination of the statutory exclusions under section 108 is beyond 
the scope of this Article. There is an abundance of fine scholarship in this area. 
See, e.g., Martin J. McMahon, Jr. & Daniel L. Simmons, A Field Guide to Cancella-
tion of Debt Income, 63 TAX LAW. 415, 449–69 (2010); Fred T. Witt, Jr. & 
William H. Lyons, An Examination of the Tax Consequences of Discharge of 
Indebtedness, 10 VA. TAX REV. 1, 43–111 (1990). There are non-statutory exclusions 
as well. See, e.g., Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey H. Kahn, Cancellation of Debt 
and Related Transactions, 69 TAX LAW. 161, 166–69 (2015). 
4 McMahon & Simmons, supra note 3, at 449. 
5 Id.
6 James L. Musselman, Is Income from Discharge of Indebtedness Really 
Income at All? A Proposal for a More Reasoned Analysis, 34 U. MEM. L. REV.
607, 608–09 (2004). 
7 Id. at 609. 
8 Professor Lawrence Zelenak observed that “[n]o non–Supreme Court federal 
income tax case in recent decades has generated more commentary from tax aca-
demics and practitioners than Zarin.” Lawrence Zelenak, Cancellation-of-Indebt-
edness Income and Transactional Accounting, 29 VA. TAX REV. 277, 321 (2009). 
9 916 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1990), rev’g 92 T.C. 1084 (1989). 
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 The Article will also examine some of the theories for de-
termining if a taxpayer has COD income and how they relate to 
Zarin.10 One commentator described Zarin as “a perplexing and 
difficult case, both theoretically and under existing tax law.”11
Another scholar referred to it as “a wonderfully wacky case.”12
Zarin dealt with whether a compulsive and unlucky gambler 
could avoid COD income when he settled with the casino for 
substantially less than what he owed.13 Along with a plethora of 
diverse third-party assessments of the case, the judges who heard 
the case and its appeal were also divided.14 The Tax Court opinion 
was decided by an eleven to eight vote for the IRS, with three 
separate dissenting opinions,15 and was followed by a Third Cir-
cuit reversal, with a two to one split of the judges.16 This writer 
has the fortunate vantage point of thirty plus years of hindsight. 
 In a much-criticized decision, the divided Third Circuit Court 
of Appeals reversed a split Tax Court and held that the hapless 
gambler, who in the year in question was in the seventy percent 
tax bracket,17 did not have a discharge of indebtedness income.18
There are some credible arguments made by very esteemed scholars 
that the holding, but generally not the reasoning, of the Third 
Circuit, that Zarin should not have had taxable income, was 
proper.19 While admittedly not entirely free from doubt, these 
10 See infra Part I. 
11 Daniel Shaviro, The Man Who Lost Too Much: Zarin v. Commissioner
and the Measurement of Taxable Consumption, 45 TAX L. REV. 215, 221 (1990). 
He may have been referring to the Tax Court decision since that was the focus of 
most of the article; although, he added an addendum to address the Third Cir-
cuit decision, which was released shortly before the article went to press. See
id. at 252–58. 
12 Deborah H. Schenk, The Story of Kirby Lumber: The Many Faces of Dis-
charge of Indebtedness Income, in TAX STORIES 137, 164 (Paul L. Caron ed., 2d 
ed. 2009). 
13 Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1084; Zarin, 916 F.2d at 111–12. 
14 Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1084–116; Zarin, 916 F.2d at 110–18. 
15 Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1084–116. 
16 Zarin, 916 F.2d at 110–18. 
17 Id. at 112. 
18 Id. at 110. 
19 Joseph M. Dodge, Zarin v. Commissioner: Musings About Debt Cancella-
tions and ‘Consumption’ in an Income Tax Base, 45 TAX L. REV. 677, 683 n.33 
(1990); Calvin H. Johnson, Zarin and the Tax Benefit Rule: Tax Models for 
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writers conclude that the right position is that he should have 
been taxed.20
 Before David Zarin sustained gambling losses at the Re-
sorts International Hotel in Atlantic City, New Jersey, and even 
prior to the codification of the treatment of income from the dis-
charge of indebtedness, the Supreme Court in United States v. 
Kirby Lumber Co. determined that a debtor had taxable income 
upon the reduction of a debt for an amount less than what it owed.21
An understanding of why the Third Circuit’s decision in Zarin was 
amiss requires some background into the conceptual frameworks for 
the determination of COD income. This begins with Kirby Lumber.
I. BACKGROUND—CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS FOR THE 
DETERMINATION OF COD INCOME AND THE 
LEGACY OF KIRBY LUMBER
 In a two-paragraph opinion,22 the Supreme Court held that 
where the taxpayer, “the Kirby Lumber Company, issued its own 
bonds for $12,126,80023 for which it received their par value24 ... 
[and] [l]ater in the same year it purchased in the open market 
some of the same bonds at less than par, the difference” was 
taxable income.25 The Court, focusing on the taxpayer’s increase 
in net worth, reasoned that “there was no shrinkage of assets 
and the taxpayer made a clear gain. As a result of its dealings it 
made available $137,521.30 assets previously offset by the obli-
gation of bonds now extinct.”26 As to why Kirby Lumber was 
able to buy its bonds back at a reduced price, Professors Marvin 
Gambling Losses and the Forgiveness of Gambling Debts, 45 TAX L. REV. 697, 
697–99 (1990); Shaviro, supra note 11, at 258. 
20 Dodge, supra note 19, at 683 n.33; Johnson, supra note 19, at 697–99; 
Shaviro, supra note 11, at 258. 
21 284 U.S. 1, 1 (1931). 
22 Professor Deborah H. Schenk characterized the decision as “one of the 
shortest Supreme Court opinions ever to pack such a wallop.” Schenk, supra
note 12, at 137. 
23 While not mentioned in the opinion, Professor Schenk indicated that 
Kirby Lumber did not in fact receive cash for the bonds, but instead, “they 
were issued for preferred stock and accrued dividend arrearages.” Id. at 138. 
24 $1,078,300. 
25 Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. at 2–3. 
26 Id. at 3. 
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A. Chirelstein and Lawrence Zelenak noted that while “the facts in 
Kirby are not fully developed, it seems reasonable to assume that 
the company was able to repurchase its bonds at a discount be-
cause of a general rise in the market rate of interest.”27
 While there is a wide consensus that the Court’s decision 
in Kirby Lumber was correct, the perceived rationale “that addi-
tional assets ... became ‘available’ to the taxpayer”28 has been 
subject to much criticism. Professors Boris Bittker and Lawrence 
Lokken opined in their seminal treatise, Federal Taxation of In-
come, Estates and Gifts, that the Kirby Lumber “result is entirely 
justifiable, but the opinion’s cryptic explanation set afloat several 
erroneous ideas leading to a confusing patchwork of rules and 
exceptions that dominates the area to this day.”29 They added 
that the Kirby Lumber reference to “no shrinkage of assets”30 has 
created “[a] particularly troublesome legacy,”31 which is the “ten-
dency of some courts to read Kirby Lumber as holding that taxa-
ble gain resulted from the freeing of assets on the cancellation of 
indebtedness, rather than the cancellation itself.”32 They indi-
cated that “[i]n actuality, income results from the discharge of 
indebtedness because the taxpayer received more than is paid back, 
not because assets are freed of offsetting liabilities on the balance 
sheet.”33 In a similar vein, Professors Chirelstein and Zelenak 
asked “[c]ould the taxpayer have avoided inclusion by showing 
that its net worth had been reduced by losses or by a decline in 
the value of other property?”34 The answer should be no. 
 While there is little doubt that “for a discharge of indebt-
edness to generate gross income, the discharge must result in an 
accession to wealth for the taxpayer,”35 there is some disagreement 
27 MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN & LAWRENCE ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: A
LAW STUDENT’S GUIDE TO THE LEADING CASES AND CONCEPTS 59 (14th ed. 2018). 
28 Id.
29 BORIS T. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶ 7.1 (2d/3d ed. 1993–2019, updated July 2020). 
30 Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. at 3. 
31 See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 29, ¶ 7.1. 
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 CHIRELSTEIN & ZELENAK, supra note 27, at 59. 
35 Witt & Lyons, supra note 3, at 5. The term “accession to wealth” is from 
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955). 
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by the courts and scholars as to the proper conceptual framework 
for making this determination.36 Professor James L. Musselman 
commented that “cases dealing with the issue of income from 
discharge of indebtedness have resulted in a variety of theories 
and results, none of which have been uniformly accepted by courts 
or commentators.”37 He faults “improper analysis”38 by the Supreme 
Court in Kirby Lumber and Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co.,39
discussed infra, and the fact that “courts subsequently dealing 
with the issue of income from discharge of indebtedness in different 
factual settings have had to give deference to those precedents 
in trying to reach a rational decision.”40 In trying to reach an 
“equitable result,”41 relating to COD income, Professor Musselman 
asserted that the “courts seized upon any precedent or idea they 
could find to rationalize their equitable result. Understandably, 
this has resulted in the confusing patchwork of theories and 
rationales for [many] decisions ....”42
 Before discussing methodologies for determining COD in-
come that are arguably explicitly derived from the language in 
Kirby Lumber, it should be noted that the loan replacement ap-
proach is a much more conceptually sound theory even though 
its connection to Kirby Lumber may be less clear. A conceptual 
framework that originated from the words used in Kirby Lumber,
the freeing of assets theory (also known as net worth or balance 
sheet theories)43 has been utilized by “[n]umerous courts”44 but also 
has been the subject of “withering criticism.”45 The methodology 
was articulated by Professor Deborah H. Schenk as follows: 
[A] debtor recognizes income when a debt is discharged because 
the discharge decreases the debtor’s liabilities but does not de-
crease the debtor’s assets. The income arises from the increase in 
36 See Musselman, supra note 6, at 610–30. 
37 Id. at 631. 
38 Id.
39 271 U.S. 170, 170–75 (1926). 
40 Musselman, supra note 6, at 631–32. 
41 Id. at 632. 
42 Id.
43 See, e.g., CHIRELSTEIN & ZELENAK, supra note 27, at 60–61. 
44 Schenk, supra note 12, at 144. 
45 Id.
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net worth. A determination of whether the taxpayer has income 
requires an examination of the taxpayer’s balance sheet at 
the time the debt is discharged.46
Professor Lawrence Zelenak commented that
[u]nder [this] approach, the manner in which the debt was in-
curred in the prior year, and in particular the consideration 
(if any) that the taxpayer received in exchange for incurring 
the debt, is irrelevant to the determination of the tax conse-
quences of the cancellation of the debt in the current year.47
He explained that “[t]his analysis looks only to the events of the 
year of the cancellation of the debt; the manner in which the 
debt was created in some earlier year does not matter.”48
 In their breakthrough article on COD income, Professors 
Boris I. Bittker and Barton H. Thompson described both the origin 
of and the error in the use of the freeing of assets theory: 
A second source of confusion in Kirby Lumber was the Court’s 
assertion that the transaction “made available $137,521.30 assets 
previously offset by the [obligation to repay].” ... A particularly 
troublesome legacy of the above passage has been the tendency 
of some courts to read Kirby Lumber as holding that it is the
freeing of assets on the cancellation of indebtedness, rather than 
the cancellation itself, that creates a taxable gain. Such rea-
soning misses the point. Income results from the discharge of 
indebtedness because the taxpayer received (and excluded 
from income) funds that he is no longer required to pay back, 
not because assets are freed of offsetting liabilities on the bal-
ance sheet. Debtors who ultimately pay back less than they 
received enjoy a financial benefit whether the funds are in-
vested successfully, lost in a business venture, spent for food 
and clothing, or given to a charity.49
46 Id.
47 Zelenak, supra note 8, at 281. 
48 Id.
49 Boris I. Bittker & Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Income From the Discharge 
of Indebtedness: The Progeny of United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 66 CALIF.
L. REV. 1159, 1165 (1978) (footnotes omitted) (quoting United States v. Kirby 
Lumber, 284 U.S. 1, 3 (1931)). Professor Thompson became a professor after 
the article was published. Biography: Barton H. “Buzz” Thompson, Jr., STAN.
L. SCH., https://law.stanford.edu/directory/barton-thompson/ [https://perma.cc 
/A84X-PJN5].
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 Professor Schenk pointed out that “if Kirby Lumber was 
able to repurchase its bonds at a discount, they were not worth 
face value immediately before the repurchase.”50 Professors Bittker 
and Lokken added that “[i]f the company’s assets and liabilities 
to creditors had been valued at their fair market values, the 
company’s net worth would have been the same before and after 
the repurchase.”51 Professor Schenk criticized this methodology, 
by observing that 
the solvency or net worth of a taxpayer is not a determinant 
of the taxability of amounts received in other situations. For 
example, it is clear that the receipt of salary by an insolvent 
taxpayer is clearly taxable income even though the debtor 
remains insolvent after using the cash to reduce the debt.52
 A Supreme Court case decided a few years prior to Kirby
Lumber, Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co.,53 had its own trou-
bling legacy which included its brief examination by the Court in 
Kirby Lumber.54 In Kerbaugh-Empire, the taxpayer owned stock 
in a company engaged in the construction business that had 
borrowed money pre–World War I, from the Deutsche Bank of 
Germany.55 The loans were payable in German marks or their 
equivalent in U.S. gold coin.56 The funds were utilized in the 
unsuccessful construction business and repaid to the Alien 
Property Custodian in substantially devalued marks after the 
war.57 The “difference between the value of the marks borrowed 
at the time the loans were made and the amount paid to the 
Custodian was $684,456.18.”58 The Commissioner argued this 
was taxable income, but the taxpayer prevailed on the theory 
that “the loss was less than it would have been if [the] marks 
had not declined in value; but the mere diminution of loss is not 
gain, profit or income.”59 Professor Schenk commented that “there 
50 Schenk, supra note 12, at 144. 
51 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 29, ¶ 7.1. 
52 Schenk, supra note 12, at 145. 
53 Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170, 170–75 (1926). 
54 Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. at 1–2. 
55 Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. at 171–72. 
56 Id. at 172. 
57 Id. at 172–73. 
58 Id. at 173. 
59 Id. at 175. 
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was an increase in net worth in Kerbaugh-Empire,” as there was 
in Kirby Lumber.60 She reasoned that 
[s]uppose a taxpayer has $100 of liabilities and $40 of assets. 
A creditor discharges a $20 loan. ... Only someone who has no 
understanding of negative numbers could fail to see that T’s 
net worth has increased, or to put it another way, that there 
has been a decrease in T’s negative net worth.61
Professor Schenk expressed a persuasive and widely shared 
disagreement with the distinction the Court made in Kirby Lumber
from Kerbaugh-Empire62 in that, in the latter case, “the transac-
tion as a whole was a loss ....”63 This distinction spawned another 
approach by some courts and scholars for determining whether a 
transaction gave rise to COD income. This methodology is referred 
to as the “the whole transaction theory”64 (also known as “the 
transaction as a whole”).65 Professor Schenk found this theory, at 
least as it has been historically utilized, as “not only theoretically 
wrong, [but] completely impractical.”66 One example she gave of 
why the historic whole transaction approach should be a non-
starter was a scenario wherein a “taxpayer borrows $20,000, invests 
it in his business, and loses the entire amount. Most likely, the loss 
would be deductible, and if he also were permitted to exclude the 
60 Schenk, supra note 12, at 145. 
61 Id. But see Zelenak, supra note 8, at 287 (freeing of assets methodology 
could be viewed as having some merit if the “focus[ is] on an increase in the 
taxpayer’s net worth, or an improvement in the taxpayer’s balance sheet [irrespec-
tive of whether or not there is positive net worth]”). He wrote that the 
freeing-of-assets was always an unfortunate way of express-
ing the idea that COD income is based on an increase in the 
taxpayer’s net worth .... If the rationale for taxation of COD 
income is that it increases the taxpayer’s net worth or im-
proves the taxpayer’s balance sheet, nothing in that rationale 
requires or even suggests that there should be no COD in-
come simply because the taxpayer does not have a positive 
net worth after the debt cancellation. In short, the insolvency 
exception [to COD income] was based on an imperfect under-
standing of the net worth (NW) theory .... 
Id.
62 See Schenk, supra note 12, at 145–47. 
63 United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 3 (1931). 
64 See, e.g., Schenk, supra note 12, at 145. 
65 Bittker & Thompson, supra note 49, at 1162. 
66 Schenk, supra note 12, at 146. 
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$20,000 when the lender discharges the debt, he effectively would 
have a double deduction.”67 This method is also unworkable.68
Professor Schenk wrote that “[i]n order to apply it, one has to know 
the use to which the borrowed funds were put. This is a com-
pletely implausible approach due to the fungibility of money.”69
 Professors Bittker and Thompson provided the following 
summary of the historic whole transaction theory’s source and 
why it is defective: 
Kirby Lumber carried forward from Kerbaugh-Empire the theory 
that the taxability of a debt discharge depends on the profita-
bility of “the transaction as a whole,” requiring consideration not 
merely of whether the taxpayer borrowed more than it repaid 
but also of whether the use of the borrowed funds was profita-
ble. It is usually impossible to make this latter determination, 
however, since the borrowed funds are ordinarily absorbed into 
the business so completely that tracing the travels of inter-
changeable dollars lacks even the surface plausibility that it 
could claim in Kerbaugh-Empire. Even where funds can be 
traced to a particular project, the attribution is artificial since 
in most cases borrowing frees up funds that the debtor can 
then use to finance other projects. It is therefore misleading 
to limit an examination of “the transaction as a whole” to the 
fate of only those projects directly financed with the borrowed 
funds. Tying the tax treatment of debt discharge to the fate of 
the borrowed funds is also irrational for another reason. Since 
the amount borrowed will ultimately be capitalized, expensed, 
or nondeductible depending on how the borrowed funds are used, 
the fate of the funds will already be reflected in the debtor’s net 
income. If borrowed funds are invested and lost in an ill-fated 
business venture, the full amount borrowed will generally be 
deductible as a business loss. If the taxpayer later settles the 
debt for less than its issue price, an exclusion of the difference 
because the funds were lost would be tantamount to a double 
deduction for a single loss.70
 Professors Martin J. McMahon, Jr. and Daniel L. Simmons 




70 See Bittker & Thompson, supra note 49, at 1162–63. 
71 McMahon & Simmons, supra note 3, at 424. Professor Schenk, however, 
noted that Kerbaugh-Empire has never been overruled. See Schenk, supra note 
12, at 148. 
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They pointed out that “the Service, the Tax Court, and the Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit have concluded that Kerbaugh-
Empire Co. lacks precedential authority in light of subsequent 
Supreme Court decisions.”72
 In contrast, the loan proceeds theory is embraced by many 
courts and scholars.73 This approach is also known as “mistake-
correction.”74 Credit is given by scholars to the article mentioned 
above by Professors Bittker and Thompson75 for influencing courts 
and fellow academics as to the merit of this approach.76
 Professors McMahon and Simmons succinctly explained 
the loan proceeds concept as,
if a debt is cancelled and the borrower is relieved of the duty to 
repay the loan, the cancellation of the debt has tax consequences 
because the benefit of receipt of cash at the time of the borrow-
ing without realization of income is offset by elimination of re-
payment, producing an overall economic benefit to the borrower.77
Professors Douglas A. Kahn and Jeffrey H. Kahn elabo-
rated on this methodology as follows: “When someone borrows 
money, the borrower does not recognize income because it is 
assumed that the borrower will repay the loan. In effect, the 
debt prevents the borrower from recognizing income because of 
the assumption that the loan will be repaid.”78 Furthermore, 
“forgiveness of the debt removes the obstacle to tax the borrower 
on the amount of the loan that would have been income when 
72 McMahon & Simmons, supra note 3, at 424–25. The Ninth Circuit deci-
sion, Vukasovich, Inc. v. Commissioner, 790 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1986) was cited 
and heavily relied upon by the Tax Court in Zarin in rejecting taxpayer’s 
contention that he had no COD income because “the settlement merely re-
duced the amount of his loss and did not result in income.” Zarin v. Comm’r, 
92 T.C. 1084, 1092 (1989). 
73 See, e.g., Schenk, supra note 12, at 147. 
74 See, e.g., Zelenak, supra note 8, at 282; Chad J. Pomeroy, Comment, Preslar 
v. Commissioner: Debt-Discharge Income and Its Rationale, 2000 BYU L. REV.
1677, 1689 (2000) (referring to mistake-correction as “symmetry”) (citing United 
States v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 310 (1983)). 
75 See generally Bittker & Thompson, supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
76 See, e.g., Zelenak, supra note 8, at 284–85 (citing Theodore P. Seto, The 
Function of the Discharge of Indebtedness Doctrine: Complete Accounting in 
the Federal Income Tax System, 51 TAX L. REV. 199, 203 (1996)). 
77 See McMahon & Simmons, supra note 3, at 419–20. 
78 See Kahn & Kahn, supra note 3, at 166. 
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borrowed if there had not then been an obligation to repay.”79 In 
other words, the extinguishment of all part of the debt, results 
in the debtor “enjoy[ing] an accretion [or more commonly re-
ferred to as an “accession”] to wealth.”80 Professors Kahn and 
Kahn observed that “[i]t is not the debtor’s increase in net worth 
that is taxable; rather, it is a tax on the amount that previously 
was thought to have been borrowed and turned out to have just 
been an enrichment of the ‘borrower.’”81
 While this latter notion of when COD income should arise 
is intellectually compelling, the Court has provided mixed sig-
nals that it has rejected the freeing of assets theory entirely for 
the loan proceeds approach.82 Professor Schenk pointed to United 
States v. Centennial Savings Bank83 as embracing both theories.84
She quoted the following passage: 
Borrowed funds are excluded from income in the first instance 
because the taxpayer’s obligation to repay the funds offsets any 
increase in the taxpayer’s assets; if the taxpayer is thereafter 
released from his obligation to repay, the taxpayer enjoys a net 
increase in assets equal to the forgiven portion of the debt, 
and the basis for the original exclusion thus evaporates.85
 A few years earlier, however, in Commissioner v. Tufts, the 
Court seemed to shift away from the freeing of assets approach.86
79 Id.
80 See Schenk, supra note 12, at 148. 
81 See Kahn & Kahn, supra note 3, at 166. 
82 See Schenk, supra note 12, at 151 (noting that “[l]egislative history indi-
cates that when Congress revamped the insolvency rules as part of the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1980, it abandoned the freeing-of-assets theory in favor of the 
loan proceeds approach”). 
83 See generally United States v. Centennial Sav. Bank, 499 U.S. 573 (1991). 
84 See Schenk, supra note 12, at 148. 
85 Schenk, supra note 12, at 148 (citing Centennial Savings Bank, 499 U.S. 
573). In Centennial Savings Bank, the Court held, in relevant part, that 
penalties collected by the taxpayer from depositors making early withdrawals 
was not “income by reason of the discharge ... of indebtedness,” and thus taxpayer 
was not entitled to exclude such amounts under an exception provided in 
section 108(a)(1). Centennial Savings Bank, 499 U.S. at 579–81. 
86 Comm’r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 313 (1983). Gregory M. Giangiordano 
noted that “[i]n Tufts, the Supreme Court essentially changed the test for 
determining discharge of indebtedness income from the previous ‘freezing of 
assets’ approach ... to a consideration of the tax symmetry of the overall loan 
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The reference to both theories by the Court in Centennial
Savings for finding COD income is not an aberration. For exam-
ple, in Commissioner v. Jacobson, a solvent taxpayer, albeit one 
in “straitened financial circumstances,” was, because of his fi-
nancial situation, able to buy back his own obligations at a dis-
count.87 The Court noted that “[i]n each sale the bondholder 
sought to minimize his probable loss by getting as much as pos-
sible, directly or indirectly, from the maker of the bonds as the 
one available purchaser of them.”88 The Court found that this 
resulted in the taxpayer having “realized an immediate financial 
transaction.” Gregory M. Giangiordano, Discharge of Indebtedness Income—Zarin 
v. Commissioner, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 1189, 1195 (1991) (citing Tufts, 461 U.S. at 
313)). Another commentator, Chad J. Pomeroy, was in accord. He explained that: 
The Supreme Court, though, in Commissioner v. Tufts, seemed 
to move away from the freed assets justification. In Tufts, the 
taxpayer owned property that was subject to a nonrecourse 
mortgage (an obligation for which he was not personally lia-
ble). The taxpayer transferred the property to a buyer, and 
the buyer assumed the nonrecourse debt. The Court held that 
the taxpayer realized income equal to the amount of the dis-
charged mortgage. The Court did not look at whether the dis-
charge freed any of the taxpayer’s assets; instead, it focused 
on the symmetry of the loan transaction. The Court reasoned 
that the taxpayer did not have to pay taxes on the original 
loan because the government assumed that he would eventu-
ally repay the debt using after-tax dollars. The Court further 
reasoned that, if the government’s prediction proved incorrect 
(the taxpayer ended up not repaying the obligation), the tax-
payer would have “effectively ... received untaxed income at 
the time the loan was extended” [citing Tufts, 461 U.S. at 310]. 
So, when it becomes clear that a taxpayer is not going to repay 
the debt (in other words, when it becomes clear that the tax-
payer received untaxed income), the IRS is allowed to remedy 
this error by taxing the amount of unpaid debt as income. It 
does not matter whether the taxpayer discharged a recourse 
mortgage or a nonrecourse mortgage (an action that would 
not free up assets because the taxpayer was never personally 
liable for the debt); what matters is that the IRS’s treatment 
of the back end of the transaction should be consistent with 
its treatment of the front end of the transaction. Tufts changed 
the rationale for debt-discharge income. No longer is a debt 
discharge included in income only when it frees assets. 
Pomeroy, supra note 74, at 1681–82 (citations omitted). 
87 See generally Comm’r v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 30 (1949). 
88 Id.
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gain from his purchase of these bonds at a discount. By that acqui-
sition he was enabled, at will, to cancel them and thus discharge 
himself from liability to pay them.”89 Signaling adherence to the 
freeing of assets concept, the Court indicated that this “improved 
his net worth by the difference between their face amount and 
the price he paid for them.”90 Two sentences later, the Court 
used language more reminiscent of the loan proceeds methodol-
ogy, when it stated “[i]n the first instance he had received the 
full face amount in cash for these bonds so that his repurchase 
of them for 50 percent, or less, of that amount reflected a sub-
stantial benefit ....”91
 It is worth noting that Congress at one point was sympa-
thetic to taxpayers in situations like those in Jacobson and Kirby 
Lumber.92 While section 108(a)(1)(A) and (B) today provide an 
exception to COD income for those taxpayers in a formal bank-
ruptcy proceeding or who are insolvent, prior to the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986, “relief under § 108 was made available not only to 
debtors in distress (like the taxpayer in Jacobson), but also to 
Kirby-type taxpayers who might be in perfectly healthy condi-
tion and simply benefitting from a general rise in market rates 
of interest.”93
89 Id. at 38. 
90 Id.
91 See Jacobson, 336 U.S. at 38–39; see also McMahon & Simmons, supra
note 3, at 420. While not germane to the issue of methodologies for the de-
termination of COD income, it should be noted that in Jacobson, the Supreme 
Court also rejected taxpayer’s argument that the gain was an excludable gift 
and distinguished its earlier decision, Helvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 
322 (1943). Jacobson, 336 U.S. at 28 (holding that a gift could arise in the 
context of a commercial settlement). Professor Schenk noted that in Commis-
sioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960), “the Supreme Court [subsequently] 
crafted a definition of a gift for income tax purposes that in most cases would 
preclude a gift where debt is discharged in a commercial setting.” Schenk, 
supra note 12, at 153. 
92 CHIRELSTEIN & ZELENAK, supra note 27, at 62. 
93 Id. See generally I.R.C. § 108. Professor Schenk elaborated on the history 
of then section 61(a)(12) and section 108: 
Congress codified the Kirby Lumber rule in § 61(a)(12) [cur-
rently § 61(a)(11)] when it adopted the Internal Revenue Code of 
1954. Previously, the provision with respect to COD income was 
only in the regulations. The 1939 Code, however, added the 
predecessor of §§ 108 and 1017. The original version of § 108 
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 While Professor Zelenak referred to the approach he advo-
cated for determining COD income as “transactional accounting” 
or “whole-transaction analysis,”94 this methodology represents a 
clarification of the loan proceeds approach. He explicitly acknowl-
edged that “[t]he [loan proceeds/mistake correction] LP/MC the-
ory should be the only theory of debt cancellation income.”95 His 
amplification of the loan proceeds methodology centered on “the 
premise that a discharge of a no-benefit debt should be non-
taxable under the [loan proceeds/mistake correction] LP/MC analy-
sis ....”96 That is, the loan proceeds concept is based on the notion 
that when the taxpayer incurred the indebtedness initially, he was 
not taxed, i.e., the taxpayer received a tax benefit because of the 
understanding that the loan would be repaid and therefore, at 
that point, there was no accession to wealth.97 If there was no 
tax benefit, COD income should not arise upon the debt settle-
ment.98 Professor Richard C. E. Beck, who was quoted by Professor 
Zelenak, explained that, “[t]o the extent the debtor did not origi-
nally receive cash or other loan proceeds in exchange for incur-
ring the debt, its cancellation should not be taxable.”99 Professor 
Zelenak pointed out that Professor Beck had “an important caveat: 
‘Even if the debtor does receive value [at the time the debt origi-
nated], no COD income should arise unless the value would have 
been taxable absent the debt.’”100 Professor Beck believed that 
permitted corporate taxpayers in ‘unsound financial condition’ 
to exclude the amount of any income attributable to discharge 
of indebtedness that was evidenced by a security. In 1942, Con-
gress eliminated the requirement that the corporation be in 
unsound financial condition. In the 1954 Code, the rule was re-
written to include individuals as well as corporations. In 1986, 
this election was eliminated except for insolvent and bankrupt 
taxpayers. When Congress subsequently added two other ex-
emptions, it extended § 108 to apply to them. 
Schenk, supra note 12, at 149. 
94 See Zelenak, supra note 8, at 280, 294. 
95 Id. at 294. 
96 Id. at 297. 
97 See id.
98 See id.
99 Id. at 297 (quoting Richard C.E. Beck, Is Compromise of a Tax Liability 
Itself Taxable? A Problem of Circularity in the Logic of Taxation, 14 VA. TAX
REV. 153, 165–66 (1994)). 
100 Id.; see Zelenak, supra note 8, at 298 (quoting Beck, supra note 99, at 167). 
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“[i]f the debtor buys or borrows nothing in exchange, incurrence 
of a debt is a loss of net worth. Cancellation of such a debt does no 
more than restore former net worth and is not gain for precisely 
the same reason that a return of capital is not gain.”101
 Professors Kahn and Kahn advocated what they refer to as 
a “transactional approach” but not the whole transaction meth-
odology as it was applied in Kerbaugh-Empire, which they opine 
“had been wrongly decided”102 and resulted in the “transactional 
approach to COD issues [being] saddled with a bad reputation.”103
Their formulation of the transactional approach was as follows: 
The gist of the transactional approach is to examine the entire 
transaction beginning with the creation of the debt and ending 
with the cancellation. If the debtor did not obtain a tax benefit 
because of the debt, the debtor should not have COD income. 
The tax benefit could be the receipt of cash or other property 
that would have been income to the debtor if the presence of 
the debt had not prevented the recognition of income. The tax 
benefit could be a deduction or the acquisition of basis that 
was made possible by the presence of the debt.104
Professor Zelenak acknowledged that a “problem [often] 
arises of how to identify a no-benefit debt. It is easy enough to 
provide a general verbal formulation of the test for a no-benefit 
debt but applying the test to particular fact patterns has produced 
considerable disagreement among commentators and the courts.”105
 An example cited by Professor Zelenak of the difficulty 
courts have, at times, applying the no-benefit debt concept was 
Bradford v. Commissioner.106 In that case, the taxpayer’s hus-
band owed a bank approximately $305,000.107 He was concerned 
that the debt might adversely affect his firm’s seat on the New 
York Stock Exchange.108 He convinced the bank to replace part 
of his debt with a $205,000 note by his wife “without receiving 
101 See Beck, supra note 99, at 166–67. 
102 See Kahn & Kahn, supra note 3, at 164. 
103 Id.
104 Id. at 200. 
105 See Zelenak, supra note 8, at 297. 
106 See generally Bradford v. Comm’r, 233 F.2d 935 (6th Cir. 1956). 
107 Id. at 936. 
108 Id.
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any consideration.”109 Her note was later replaced, at the bank’s 
request, with two notes, one for $105,000, to which she pledged 
collateral, and a note for $100,000, which was unsecured.110 Three 
years later, in 1946, after a bank examiner compelled $50,000 of 
the second note to be written off, the bank informed the taxpayer 
that it was agreeable to sell the $100,000 note for $50,000, and 
her brother-in-law purchased the note for $50,000.111 The Tax 
Court determined that she had an ordinary income of $50,000.112
The taxpayer appealed this decision on grounds that: 1) this was 
essentially a gift from the bank and 2) “that because she re-
ceived nothing when the note was executed by her ..., she did not 
realize income in 1946 when the note was cancelled for less than 
its face amount, even if the cancellation was not a gift.”113
 The Sixth Circuit, citing Jacobson, among other authori-
ties, indicated that “[w]e cannot say the Tax Court’s ultimate 
finding that there was no gift ... was clearly erroneous ....”114 As 
to whether the taxpayer had COD income in 1946, the Sixth 
Circuit reversed the Tax Court’s decision and held for the tax-
payer.115 In its reasoning, the court first rejected the application 
of the freeing of assets approach. The court stated that “[a] me-
chanical application of these principles would of course support 
the Tax Court’s decision. Looking alone to the year 1946 ... it is 
obvious that when $100,000 of the petitioner’s indebtedness was 
discharged for $50,000 in that year, she realized a balance sheet 
improvement of $50,000 ....”116 The court then announced that 
“[w]e cannot agree with the Commissioner, however, that these 
principles are to be applied so mechanically.”117 The court, citing 
and discussing Kerbaugh-Empire, observed that it “has been 
called ‘a frequently criticized and not easily understood deci-






114 Id. at 937. 
115 Id. at 939. 
116 Id. at 938. 
117 Id.
118 Id. at 938–39. 
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Whatever validity the Kerbaugh-Empire Co. decision may now 
have on its own facts, it remains an authority for the proposition 
that in deciding the income tax effect of cancellation of indebted-
ness for less than its face amount, a court need not in every 
case be oblivious to the net effect of the entire transaction.119
The court, then however, pivoted, to a loan proceeds approach.120
 Professor Zelenak stated that in Bradford, the Sixth Circuit 
“appl[ied] the LP/MC [loan proceeds/mistake correction] theory 
to the Tax Court’s no-benefit finding ... [and] concluded that ‘by any 
realistic standard the petitioner never realized any income at all 
from the transaction’ and ruled in Mrs. Bradford’s favor.”121 The 
court based this conclusion on the fact that “[t]he Tax Court une-
quivocally found as a fact that petitioner received no consideration 
when she executed this note ... [and t]his finding is not clearly 
erroneous ....”122 While the rejection of the utilization of a bal-
ance sheet/net worth test was correct, its application of loan pro-
ceeds with net benefit approach is questionable. Professor Zelenak 
noted that “[t]he majority view among commentators[, including 
himself,] is that Bradford was wrongly decided; the court should 
have rejected as clearly erroneous the Tax Court’s findings that 
Mrs. Bradford received nothing from the bank in exchange for 
the note.”123 He was of the opinion, with which this writer concurs, 
“that the [original] debtor substitution ... was the equivalent of 
Mrs. Bradford’s borrowing $205,000 cash from the bank and 
giving the cash to Mr. Bradford, followed by Mr. Bradford’s us-
ing the gifted cash to repay his debt to the bank.”124
 As to the focus of this Article, Zarin, Professor Zelenak 
opined “that it provides another illustration of how difficult it 
sometimes is to apply the LP/MC analysis of COD income, contrary 
to the expectation of Bittker and Thompson that COD income anal-
ysis would always be simple under the LP/MC framework.”125
 Professor Schenk observed that the various theories of 
when COD income should or should not occur “do not necessarily 
119 Id. at 939. 
120 Id.
121 Zelenak, supra note 8, at 304 (citing Bradford, 233 U.S. at 938). 
122 Bradford, 233 U.S. at 936 n.1. 
123 Zelenak, supra note 8, at 304. 
124 Id.
125 Id. at 324–25 (referencing Bittker & Thompson, supra note 49, at 1165). 
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produce the same result.”126 She gave as an example, similar to 
one offered by other commentators, including Professor Zelenak,127
wherein “T promises to make a payment to X (in a situation that 
would not produce a deduction when the payment is made), and 
T is ultimately freed from that obligation.”128 She stated that 
“[u]nder the freeing-of-assets theory, T would have COD income 
because his balance sheet is no longer encumbered by the obliga-
tion. Under the loan proceeds theory, however, T would have no 
income because he had not received any income or property at 
the time he incurred the obligation.”129 She indicated that 
“[u]nder the whole transaction approach, it would be necessary 
to know what T did with the proceeds of the loan.”130 Professors 
Kahn and Kahn, who offered a similar hypothetical, observed 
that under their interpretation of the transactional approach, 
there would simply be no COD income regardless of what T did 
with the money, because all that has happened is that T gave 
less or in the case posited by Professor Schenk gave nothing.131
 In reaching the above conclusion, Professors Kahn and Kahn 
cited an example132 provided by the Second Circuit decision, Com-
missioner v. Rail Joint Co.133 The hypothetical offered by the 
Second Circuit was as follows: 
Suppose that a taxpayer validly contracts in 1930 to give $1,000 
to a charity in 1931, and in the latter year compromises the 
obligation by paying $500 in full settlement. If the taxpayer 
returns his income on a cash basis, this transaction cannot 
possibly increase his income. The giving of the obligation cer-
tainly added nothing to income in 1930, and the payment of it 
in 1931 will appear only as a deduction of the sum actually paid 
in that year to the use of a charitable corporation. If he were 
126 Schenk, supra note 12, at 149. Professors Chirelstein and Zelenak, re-
ferring to “freeing of assets” and “loan proceeds” methodologies, commented, 
however, that “[t]he choice between two rationales for the taxation of debt cancel-
lation income usually makes no difference, because the same income inclusion 
would be required under either rationale.” See CHIRELSTEIN & ZELENAK,
supra note 27, at 61. 
127 See Zelenak, supra note 8, at 294. 
128 Schenk, supra note 12, at 149. 
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 See Kahn & Kahn, supra note 3, at 165–66. 
132 Id. at 165 n.20. 
133 Comm’r v. Rail Joint Co., 61 F.2d 751, 752 (2d Cir. 1932). 
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to report on an accrual basis and were allowed to deduct from 
gross income for 1930 the $1,000 liability incurred in that year, 
then it might be said that the settlement of the liability in 1931 
for a less sum had released the difference to general uses of the 
taxpayer and the sum so released should appear as income then 
received in order that the returns for both years might truly re-
flect the effect of the whole transaction upon the net income.134
Rail Joint concerned a corporation paying a dividend in the form 
of the corporation’s bond with a face value of $2 million.135 These 
bonds were later purchased at less than face value with the dif-
ference credited to surplus.136 The court distinguished Kirby
Lumber and simply treated this event as a reduction of the divi-
dend.137 The Second Circuit stated that “it is not universally 
true that by discharging a liability for less than its face amount 





138 Id.; see also Zelenak, supra note 8, at 282. Professor Zelenak, described 
the court’s reasoning with the following analysis: 
Because the taxpayer received nothing of value when it issued 
the bonds as dividends ... the overall transaction did not result in 
any economic gain or any taxable gain .... “In paying dividends 
to shareholders, the corporation does not buy property from 
them. Here the [taxpayer] never received any increment to its 
assets, either at the time the bonds were delivered or at the 
time they were retired.” 
Id. Professor Zelenak noted, however, that: 
There is a split among the commentators who have considered 
whether the Rail Joint court properly applied LP/MC [ loan 
proceeds/mistake correction] analysis. The split is based on 
disagreement as to whether the taxpayer received anything of 
value when it distributed a dividend in the form of its own 
debt. Six commentators (including two co-authors) agree with 
the Second Circuit’s assumption that the taxpayer received 
nothing of value when it issued the bonds, and so agree with 
the court’s conclusion that the taxpayer had no COD income 
when it repurchased the bonds at a discount. Four other 
commentators (including two co-authors), however, claim that 
the Second Circuit was wrong, either because the bond divi-
dend should be analogized to a sale of bonds to third parties 
for cash followed by the distribution of the cash proceeds to 
shareholders, or because a corporation should be understood 
as receiving a benefit analogous to a human being’s personal 
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 Professors Chirelstein and Zelenak posited another fact 
pattern where utilizing different methodologies involving the de-
termination of COD income could result in dissimilar outcomes.139
This example involved a pedestrian, negligently injured by an 
uninsured motorist, who received a $100,000 judgment.140 Be-
cause of difficulty in collecting, the pedestrian accepted $80,000, 
and gave up his claim to the remaining $20,000.141 Does the 
motorist have COD income?142 Under the freeing of assets ap-
proach he would have COD income; “his net worth increase[d] by 
$20,000 when liabilities decrease[d] by $100,000 while assets 
decrease[d] by only $80,000.”143 Under the loan proceeds approach, 
which they indicated “should be the sole theory of debt-
cancellation income, ... the result [should be] that the $20,000 
debt cancellation should not be taxed to the negligent motorist.”144
Presumably, under their version of the transactional approach, 
Professors Kahn and Kahn would also reach the result that 
there was no COD income.145
 There are other theories of when COD income should be 
determined to occur. Another approach, advocated by Professor 
James L. Musselman, was that: 
when a taxpayer has received a discharge of indebtedness, it 
must simply be determined whether such discharge resulted 
in a clearly realized accession to the taxpayer’s wealth, and in 
consumption when it distributes value—including value in the 
form of its own bonds—to its shareholders. 
Id. at 299 (footnotes omitted). Professor Zelenak is of the opinion that while “[i]t 
is a close call ... [o]n balance, the argument in favor of COD income in the Rail
Joint situation, based on the concept of dividends as the corporate analogue 
to personal consumption, should probably prevail.” Id. at 303. 
139 CHIRELSTEIN & ZELENAK, supra note 27, at 62–63. 
140 Id.
141 Id. at 63. 
142 See id.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 63. Professor Zelenak expanded upon the negligent tortfeasor hy-
pothetical in his Virginia Tax Review article. He wrote that “[t]he commenta-
tors who have considered this situation are in agreement that it produces no 
COD income under the LP/MC analysis, because the taxpayer received nothing 
of value when the debt arose.” Zelenak, supra note 8, at 313–14. 
145 See Kahn & Kahn, supra note 3, at 166 (“If any part of the debt is for-
given, it then becomes clear that the assumption of a repayment of that part 
of the debt was mistaken.”). 
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what amount. ... [T]he amount of any such accession to wealth 
is determined by the value of anything the taxpayer received 
as a result of any such discharge of indebtedness, as with any 
other gross income issue. When determining the value received 
from the discharge of indebtedness, it is necessary to evaluate 
the transaction that initially created the indebtedness since any 
value the taxpayer received from a discharge of indebtedness 
would have been received at that time. Notably, the value re-
ceived by the taxpayer at the time of the transaction initially 
creating the indebtedness would not have been included in the 
taxpayer’s gross income at that time because the receipt of such 
value coincided with the creation of the indebtedness by the tax-
payer, thus resulting in no accession to the taxpayer’s wealth.146
Professor Musselman acknowledged that his “proposal resembles, 
to an extent, the ‘loan proceeds theory’ [except that] ... [t]he ‘loan 
proceeds theory’ assumes that the taxpayer, in all cases in which 
he incurs an obligation, received value equal in amount to the 
obligation incurred.”147 Under Professor Musselman’s proposal 
“that assumption is inapplicable in [what he characterized as] 
appropriate situations.”148
 Professor Musselman discussed his proposed methodology 
with respect to an obligation for services, which is germane to 
Zarin.149 He posited an example wherein “a taxpayer agrees to 
pay an accountant $1,000 to prepare his tax return. After pre-
paring and filing the return, the taxpayer is discharged from the 
$1,000 obligation.”150 While he indicated that the taxpayer would 
generally have $1,000 of COD income, “[i]f the taxpayer, in a case 
with appropriate facts, can show that he received value in a lesser 
amount than the debt incurred, he should not have income from 
the discharge of such debt in excess of the value received.”151
 One example of where the clarified loan proceeds method-
ology advocated by Professor Zelenak152 differs from Professor 
146 Musselman, supra note 6, at 632–33 (footnotes omitted). 
147 Id. at 633 n.160 (citations omitted). 
148 Id. (citation omitted). 
149 See id. at 635. 
150 Id. at 634–35. 
151 Id. at 635 (footnote omitted); Professor Musselman noted that Professor 
Dodge achieved a similar outcome under the latter’s belief that “the purchase-price 
adjustment doctrine exists outside of section 108(e)(5) ....” Id. at 635 n.170 (citing 
Dodge, supra note 19, at 682). This is discussed further below. 
152 Professor Zelenak used the terminology “transactional accounting” and 
“whole-transaction analysis.” Zelenak, supra note 8, at 280, 294. 
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Musselman’s proposed approach involved federal tax liabilities 
that are avoided due to a statute of limitations.153 For example, 
the taxpayer owed a certain amount of tax, e.g., $50,000 but the 
taxpayer “fails to pay the liability and for whatever reason, the 
statute of limitations for collecting such liability expires.”154 Under 
Professor Musselman’s methodology, there would be COD, be-
cause his “focus [was] on whether the taxpayer received anything of 
value when the obligation was created,”155 and he presumed a 
benefit from the government commensurate with the tax origi-
nally owed.156 He explained that “[t]ax obligations are imposed on 
taxpayers by operation of law ..., and all taxpayers receive some 
level of benefit as a result .... It makes good policy to presume 
that the value received is equal to the obligation imposed ....”157
Therefore it makes sense to “force gross income from discharge 
of indebtedness on taxpayers to the extent they are relieved of 
their obligations to pay their tax liabilities.”158 In contrast, Pro-
fessor Zelenak asserted that “[b]ecause the taxpayer whose fed-
eral income tax liability is cancelled receives no benefit excluded 
from income by reason of the existence of the federal income tax 
liability, under the LP/MC analysis he should have no COD in-
come from the cancellation.”159
 Finally, it is important to briefly examine the interplay 
between the judicial concepts and the Code with respect to COD 
income, which is important in examining Zarin. Professors 
McMahon and Simmons indicated that one must “[r]ecognize 
that section 61(a)(12) [now 61(a)(11)] and judicial precedents and 
section 108 provides overriding and supplemental rules.”160 They 
expressed their opinion that “because of the extensive detail in 
section 108, even when not expressly provided for by the statute, 
the Service and the courts tend to treat section 108 as providing 
the exclusive rules, supplanting prior judicial decisions with respect 
to issues that are addressed in the statutory provision.”161 They 
153 See Musselman, supra note 6, at 654. 
154 See id.; see also Zelenak, supra note 8, at 316. 




159 Zelenak, supra note 8, at 316. 
160 McMahon & Simmons, supra note 3, at 425. 
161 Id. at 425–26 (footnote omitted). 
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did, however, recognize that “[s]ome judicial exceptions nevertheless 
survive in cases not addressed by section 108.”162 Professor 
Dodge expressed a somewhat contradictory view when he wrote 
in the context of Zarin, “[t]he parameters of such income [i.e., 
COD income] are determined neither by § 108 nor the § 61 regula-
tions, but rather by the evolving ‘common law’ of gross income.”163
II. ZARIN V. COMMISSIONER
A. Facts & Tax Court Opinion 
 David Zarin and his wife, who filed jointly, were in Tax 
Court contesting a deficiency by the Service.164 This matter con-
cerned an alleged $2.935 million of cancellation of indebtedness 
income in 1981 from the partial discharge of gambling loans re-
ceived by Mr. Zarin.165 David Zarin “was a professional engineer 
involved in the development, construction, and management of 
various housing projects.”166 He was also a compulsive gambler, 
who by January 1980 “was gambling 12–16 hours per day, 7 
days per week [and] was not aware of the amount of his gam-
bling debts.”167 His plight was described by one scholar as a “pit-
iable tale.”168
 While Zarin had gambled elsewhere, he began gambling at 
Resorts International Hotel, Inc. (Resorts) after New Jersey legal-
ized casino gambling in Atlantic City, New Jersey.169 He applied 
for a $10,000 line of credit for gambling from Resorts on June 
1978, which was approved despite some derogatory information.170
This was increased to $200,000 in November 1979 without a further 
162 Id. at 426 (footnote omitted). 
163 Dodge, supra note 19, at 677–78. 
164 Zarin v. Comm’r, 916 F.2d 110, 111 (3d Cir. 1990). 
165 Id. In the Third Circuit opinion, the court observed that the Service ini-
tially “determined deficiencies in Zarin’s federal income taxes for 1980 and 
1981, arguing that Zarin recognized $3,435,000 of income in 1980 from lar-
ceny by trick and deception. After Zarin challenged that claim by filing a Tax 
Court petition, the Commissioner abandoned his 1980 claim ....” Id. at 112. 
166 Id.
167 Id. at 1088. 
168 Babette B. Barton, Legal and Tax Incidents of Compulsive Behavior: 
Lessons from Zarin, 45 TAX L., 749, 749 (1992). 
169 See Zarin v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1084, 1085 (1989). 
170 Id.
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credit check.171 It was further increased to $215,000 in April 1980, 
again without an additional credit inquiry.172
 Line of credit gamblers, such as Zarin, were “able to re-
ceive chips at the gambling table. Patrons of New Jersey casinos 
may not gamble with currency, but must use chips provided by 
the casino. Chips may not be used outside the casino where they 
were issued for any purpose.”173 In order to obtain the chips Zarin 
signed “counter checks, commonly known as ‘markers.’ The markers 
were negotiable drafts payable to Resorts drawn on petitioner’s 
bank. The markers made no reference to chips, but stated that 
cash had been received.”174 Zarin and the Resort’s credit manager 
agreed that his “markers would be held for the maximum period 
allowable under New Jersey law, which at that time was 90 days, 
whereupon [he] would redeem them with a personal check.”175
 Zarin focused on playing mainly craps, and “usually bet the 
table limit,”176 which was increased, at Zarin’s request, “to the house 
maximum.”177 He became a Resorts “valued gaming patron”178 and 
he and his guests received various complimentary perks includ-
ing a luxurious suite, free meals and the use of a limousine.179
 The Tax Court indicated that “[a]t all times pertinent hereto, 
[Zarin] intended to repay any credit amount properly extended 
to him by Resorts and to pay Resorts in full the amount of any 
personal check given by him to pay for chips or to reduce his 
gambling debt.”180 In fact, he paid back to Resorts approximately 
$2.5 million incurred between June 1978 and June 1979.181
 A complaint was filed in October 1979 by the New Jersey 
Division of Gaming Enforcement with the New Jersey Casino 
Control Commission alleging “809 violations pertaining to Resorts’ 
casino gaming credit system, its internal procedures, and its 
administrative and accounting controls[ ] ... [with] 100 [of those 
171 Id. at 1086. 
172 Id. at 1088. 
173 Id. at 1086. 
174 Id.
175 Id. at 1086. 
176 Id. at 1085. 
177 Id. at 1086. 
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 1086–87. 
181 Id. at 1087. 
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violations] specifically identified as pertaining to [Zarin] and a 
gambling companion.”182 This resulted in the Casino Control Com-
mission issuing an emergency cease and desist order that in-
cluded the following: 
Effective immediately, Resorts shall not issue credit to any 
patron whose patron credit reference card indicates that the 
credit now outstanding exceeds the properly approved credit 
limit. In determining whether a credit limit has been exceed-
ed, all yet undeposited checks received in payment of a coun-
ter check or checks shall be included as credits.183
Resorts adopted a policy, put in place after the order was 
issued, that treated Zarin’s “personal checks as ‘considered 
cleared.’”184 As a result, Zarin’s personal checks were “treated as 
a cash transaction, and the amount of [each] check was not in-
cluded in determining whether he had reached his permanent 
credit limit.”185 Furthermore, “Resorts extended petitioner’s credit 
limit by giving him temporary increases known as ‘this trip only’ 
credit.”186 The Tax Court pointed out that “[a]lthough not specif-
ically addressed by the New Jersey Casino Control regulations 
in effect during 1979 and 1980, a ‘this trip only’ credit increase 
was a temporary credit increase for a patron’s current trip to 
Atlantic City, and was required to be reduced before the patron’s 
return.”187 The Tax Court observed that “[b]oth of these practices 
effectively ignored the emergency order.”188 In 1983, “Resorts was 
fined $130,000 for violating the Emergency Order on at least 13 
different occasions, 9 of which pertained directly to credit trans-
actions [with Zarin].”189
 According to the court, “[d]uring April 1980, petitioner de-
livered personal checks and markers in the total amount of 
$3,435,000 that were returned to Resorts as having been drawn 








189 Id. at 1088. 
190 Id.
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was cut off on April 29, 1980.191 Although Zarin told Resorts chief 
executive officer that he intended to repay the debt, he didn’t do 
so and in November 1980, “Resorts filed a complaint in New 
Jersey State Court seeking collection of $3,435,000 from [Zarin] 
based on the unpaid personal checks and markers.”192 Zarin did 
file an answer to the complaint, in which he denied “the allega-
tions and assert[ed] a variety of affirmative defenses.”193 In Sep-
tember 1981 the lawsuit was settled with Zarin “agreeing to make 
a series of payments totaling $500,000.”194 The difference between 
this amount and original indebtedness of $3.435 million was the 
$2.935 million COD income in question before the Tax Court.195
 Sitting en banc, the Tax Court held that Zarin had COD 
income as a result of the settlement with Resorts, although the 
Tax Court judges were divided on this question eleven to eight.196
In reaching this result the court rejected the taxpayer’s asser-
tions that there should be no COD income because: 1) “the debt 
instruments were not enforceable under New Jersey law”;197 2) 
“gambling and debts incurred to acquire gambling opportunity 
have always received special treatment at common law and in 
the Internal Revenue Code”;198 3) the settlement constituted a 
purchase-money debt reduction that was excluded from gross 
income pursuant to section 108(e)(5);199 4) finding for the Service 
“would result in taxing petitioner on his losses”;200 5) “settle-
ment of disputed debts does not give rise to income;”201 and 6) 
“any income from discharge of his gambling debt was income 
from gambling against which he may offset his losses.”202
 The court first determined that the burden of proof was 






196 See generally id.
197 Id. at 1090. 
198 Id. (citing United States v. Hall, 307 F.2d 238 (10th Cir. 1962)). 
199 See id. at 1097–98. 
200 Id. at 1090. 
201 Id. at 1095. 
202 Id. at 1096. 
203 See id. at 1088. 
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matter,”204 since the Service was now asserting the deficiency 
based on COD income for 1981 which “clearly requires different 
evidence from the ground originally asserted in the notice of 
deficiency, that the income was received in 1980 from larceny by 
trick and deception.”205 As such, the court indicated that because 
the Service “bears the burden of proof, [it] can prevail only if the 
stipulated facts support a conclusion that a discharge of indebt-
edness occurred that resulted in taxable income under the law.”206
 The Tax Court noted that while the general rule in the 
Code is that “gross income includes all income from whatever 
source derived, including income from the discharge of indebt-
edness[,] ... [n]ot all discharges of indebtedness, however, result 
in income.”207 As to the latter point, the court quoted from the 
applicable regulations that “[t]he discharge of indebtedness, in 
whole or in part, may result in the realization of income.”208
 At least initially, the Tax Court seemingly embraced the 
“freeing of assets” theory, observing that “[t]he gain to the debtor 
from such discharge is the resultant freeing up of his assets that 
he would otherwise have been required to use to pay the debt.”209
The court’s reasoning later, however, altered to more of a loan re-
placement approach.210 This included the statement concluding  
the taxpayer did receive value at the time he incurred the debt 
and that only his promise to repay the value received prevented 
taxation of the value received at the time of the credit transaction. 
When, in the subsequent year, a portion of the obligation to 
repay was forgiven ... [this caused section 61(a)(12) to apply].211
As discussed below, this loan proceeds approach was also evidenced 
by the discussion of Tufts and its requirement for symmetry.212 It 
should be observed that the taxpayer in arguing that he had no 
COD income because the obligation was unenforceable, asserted 
204 Id. at 1089. 
205 Id.
206 Id. at 1090. 
207 Id. at 1089 (citing I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) (currently I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(11), 1.61-
12(a)). 
208 Id. (citing Reg. § 1.61-12(a)) (emphasis in opinion). 
209 Id. (citing United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931)). 
210 See id. at 1094. 
211 Id. at 1094. 
212 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
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that under the freeing of assets theory “[its] discharge ... had no 
effect whatsoever on his net worth and could [thus] not result in 
debt discharge income.”213
 As noted, Zarin cited Hall in support of his position that 
gambling debts are treated differently from other obligations.214
While Hall was not found to be compelling precedent by the Tax 
Court, the Third Circuit disagreed.215 In Hall, “the taxpayer 
transferred appreciated property in satisfaction of a gambling 
debt of an undetermined amount incurred in Las Vegas, Nevada. 
The Commissioner sought to tax as gain the difference between 
the amount of the discharged debt and the basis of the appreci-
ated property.”216 Gambling debts were unenforceable in Nevada.217
The Tenth Circuit stated in Hall that “[t]he general rules relied 
upon by the government as having application to gain realized 
from cancellation of debt, sound as such rules may be in the or-
dinary course of business affairs, are but artificial theory when 
applied to the facts of the case at bar.”218 Furthermore, it stated 
“Congress has recognized that gain and loss from gambling re-
quires special treatment within the tax structure ... [and that] a 
gambling debt ... does not meet the requirements of debt neces-
sary to justify the mechanical operation of general rules of tax law 
relating to cancellation of debt.”219 The Tenth Circuit also indi-
cated that “[t]he cold fact is that taxpayer suffered a substantial loss 
from gambling”220 and “conclude[d] that under the circumstances 
of the case” that taxpayer did not have taxable income.221
 The Zarin Tax Court dispensed with Hall by tying the deci-
sion to Kerbaugh-Empire, perhaps questionably, at least according 
to the Third Circuit in Zarin.222 The Tax Court pointed out that 
213 Theodore P. Seto, Inside Zarin, 59 S.M.U. L. REV. 1761, 1776 (2006) 
(citing Opening Brief for Petitioner, at 62–63, Zarin v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1084 
(1989) (No. 21371-86)). 
214 Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1090. 
215 Zarin v. Comm’r, 916 F.2d 110, 115–16 (3d Cir. 1990). 
216 Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1091. 
217 Id.
218 United States v. Hall, 307 F.2d 238, 241 (10th Cir. 1962). 
219 Id. (citations omitted). 
220 Id.
221 Id. at 242. 
222 Id. As discussed infra, the Third Circuit believed that Hall’s reliance on 
Kerbaugh-Empire was limited to “the proposition that ‘a court need not in 
every case be oblivious to the net effect of the entire transaction.’” Zarin, 916 
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the Tenth Circuit in Hall, “relied on the so-called ‘diminution of loss 
theory’ developed by the Supreme Court in Bowers v. Kerbaugh-
Empire .... ”223 The Tax Court explained that in Kerbaugh-Empire,
“the taxpayer borrowed money that was subsequently lost in a 
business transaction. The debt was satisfied for less than its face 
amount. The Supreme Court held that the taxpayer was not re-
quired to recognize income from discharge of a debt because the 
transaction as a whole lost money.”224
The Tax Court in Zarin pointed out that Kerbaugh-Empire 
“has lost its vitality.”225 It cited Vukasovich, Inc. v. Commissioner,226
wherein the Ninth Circuit concluded that “the principles of Ker-
baugh-Empire had been rejected by the Supreme Court in the 
subsequent cases ... even though the 1926 case had not been 
specifically overruled ....”227
 In terms of the enforceability of the obligation in New 
Jersey, the court stated that the “[l]egal enforceability of an ob-
ligation to repay is not determinative of whether the receipt of 
money or property is taxable .... The enforceability of petitioner’s 
debts under New Jersey law did not affect either the timing or 
the amount and thus is not determinative for federal income tax 
purposes.”228 It thus ignored the fact that in Hall, the Tenth 
Circuit, indicated that “a gambling debt [is] unenforceable in 
every state,”229 which may have factored in the Tenth Circuit 
reaching its decision.230
 Very importantly, the Tax Court also cited and discussed 
Commissioner v. Tufts, holding that “upon sale of mortgaged 
property, the seller–original borrower must include the amount 
of the nonrecourse mortgage assumed by the purchaser in calcu-
lating the amount realized from sale, even when the fair market 
F.2d at 116 n.11 (quoting Hall, 307 F.2d at 242); see infra Section II.B. Pro-
fessor Babette B. Barton also concluded that “[t]he majority opinion of the Tax 
Court in Zarin erroneously concluded that the Hall case relied on Kerbaugh-
Empire Co.” Barton, supra note 168, at 756 n.43. 
223 Zarin v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1084, 1091 (1989) 
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 Vukasovich, Inc. v. Comm’r, 790 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1986). 
227 Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1093. 
228 Id. at 1094, 1095. 
229 United States v. Hall, 307 F.2d 238, 241 (10th Cir. 1962). 
230 See id. at 242. 
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value of the property is less than the outstanding amount of the 
nonrecourse obligation.”231 The Tax Court stressed that the Tufts 
rationale was based on symmetry: 
[T]hat the original inclusion of the amount of the mortgage in 
basis rested on the assumption that the mortgagor incurred 
an obligation to repay .... Unless the outstanding amount of the 
mortgage is deemed to be realized, the mortgagor effectively 
will have received untaxed income at the time the loan was 
extended and will have received an unwarranted increase in 
the basis of his property ....232
The Tax Court then indicated that 
symmetry from year to year is not accomplished unless we 
treat petitioner’s receipt of the loan from Resorts ... and the 
subsequent discharge of his obligation to repay that loan in a 
consistent manner. [Zarin] received credit of $3,435,000 from 
Resorts. He treated these amounts as a loan, not reporting 
any income on his 1980 tax return.233
 The Tax Court also rejected the notion that due to the prece-
dent of Kerbaugh-Empire, Zarin’s loss of the loan proceeds should 
have shielded him from COD income.234 The Tax Court also de-
clared that “[w]e are not persuaded that gambling debts should be 
accorded any special treatment for the benefit of the gambler—
compulsive or not.”235
 The Tax Court similarly denied application of the contested 
liability/disputed debt exception to COD income that was recognized 
by the Board of Tax Appeals in N. Sobel, Inc. v. Commissioner,236 a 
case cited by the taxpayer.237 By way of background, where applica-
ble, the contested liability (also known as disputed debt) doctrine 
provides that “settlement of a claim does not result in realization 
of [COD] income if there is a bona fide dispute regarding the 
231 Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1092. The taxable income in Tufts, however, was not 
determined under § 61(a)(11). 
232 Id. (citing United States v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 309–10 (1983)). 
233 Id.
234 Id. at 1093–94. 
235 Id. at 1095. 
236 N. Sobel, Inc. v. Comm’r, 40 B.T.A. 1263, 1265 (1939).
237 Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1095–96. 
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debtor’s liability for the amount claimed by the creditor.”238 Some 
scholars including Professors Kahn & Kahn, however, are of the 
view that “there is either no contested liability exclusion [to 
COD] income or there should not be.”239
 With reasoning similar to a later decision, Preslar v. 
Commissioner,240 discussed infra, the Tax Court stated that “[p]rior 
to the settlement, the amount of petitioner’s gambling debt to 
Resorts was a liquidated amount, unlike the taxpayer’s debt in 
Hall.”241 Zarin had “at the time the debt was created ... agreed 
and intended to repay the full amount ... he received full value for 
what he agreed to pay, i.e., over $3 million worth of chips and the 
benefits received by petitioner as a ‘valued gambling patron’ of 
Resorts.”242 Furthermore, the Tax Court asserted, “[t]here is no 
dispute about the amount petitioner received .... A genuine dis-
pute does not exist merely because petitioner required Resorts to 
sue him before making payment of any amount on the debt.”243
Thus, even though Resorts apparently had concerns about the 
debt’s enforceability, which could be at least one of the reasons it 
agreed to a heavily discounted $500,000 settlement, the Tax Court, 
believed it did not come within a disputed debt exception to rec-
ognizing COD income.244 Thus N. Sobel and the contested liability 
(disputed debt) doctrine were found to be inapplicable.245
 N. Sobel was referred to by the Third Circuit in Zarin, as 
“[t]he seminal ‘contested liability’ case.”246 The decision concerned a 
taxpayer, who was a dealer in fur skins and had bought stock in 
a bank, which he had done business with for many years.247 The 
shares were paid for with a promissory note.248 The purchase was 
precipitated by “a campaign to sell the bank’s stock ....”249 The note 
238 See McMahon & Simmons, supra note 3, at 435 (footnote omitted). 
239 See Kahn & Kahn, supra note 3, at 206. 
240 167 F.3d 1323, 1328 (10th Cir. 1999) rev’g & rem’g TC Memo 1996-543 
(1996). 
241 Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1095. 
242 Id. at 1096. 
243 Id. at 1095–96. 
244 Id. at 1096. 
245 Id.
246 Zarin v. Comm’r, 916 F.2d 110, 115 (3d Cr. 1990) 
247 N. Sobel, Inc. v. Comm’r, 40 B.T.A. 1263, 1263–64 (1939). 
248 Id. at 1264. 
249 Id. at 1263. 
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was never paid, and instead the taxpayer “instituted suit against 
the bank, demanding rescission of the purchase contract and the 
loan and a judgment for the interest paid, on the ground that the 
bank made the loan in violation of law and failed to carry out 
promises to guarantee the purchaser against loss.”250 The bank 
was closed because of insolvency and a countersuit was brought 
against the taxpayer by the Superintendent of Banks of the State 
of New York.251 The lawsuits were settled with the taxpayer paying 
half of the note.252 The Service’s assertion that the remaining 
balance of the note was taxable to the company was rejected by 
the court, which indicated “that the release of the note was not 
the occasion for a freeing of assets and that there was no gain 
under the doctrine of Kirby Lumber Co. v. United States ....”253
As will be discussed, the Tenth Circuit in Preslar distinguished 
N. Sobel and found the contested liability/disputed debt doctrine 
inapplicable in case involving a liquidated debt obligation.254
 With respect to the taxpayer’s assertion that he should be 
able to offset any COD income with gambling losses, the Tax Court 
responded that neither section 165 nor the regulations thereunder 
permit such treatment.255 The court stated that Zarin “incurred 
gambling losses in 1980, but his gain from the discharge of his gam-
bling debts occurred in 1981. That gain is separate and apart from 
the losses he incurred from his actual wagering transactions.”256
 As to Zarin’s contention that the settlement with Resorts 
should be treated as a “purchase-money debt reduction,”257 and 
as such, he was not taxable pursuant to section 108(e)(5), the Tax 
Court was equally dismissive.258 It stated “that the value received 
by petitioner in exchange for the credit extended by Resorts does 
not constitute the type of property to which section 108(e)(5) was 
intended to or reasonably can be applied.”259 Section 108(e)(5) 
250 Id. at 1264. 
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 Id. at 1265. 
254 Preslar v. Comm’r, 167 F.3d 1323, 1327–28 (10th Cir. 1999). 
255 Zarin v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1084, 1096 (1989). 
256 Id.
257 Id. at 1097. 
258 Id. at 1098. 
259 Id.
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provides for an exception to COD income for solvent debtors for 
a reduction in debt that arose from the purchase of property.260
 The Tax Court, citing the provision’s legislative history, 
explained that “section 108(e)(5) was enacted ‘to eliminate disa-
greements between the Internal Revenue Service and the debtor 
as to whether, in a particular case to which the provision ap-
plies, the debt reductions should be treated as discharge income 
or a true price adjustment.’”261 The court reasoned Zarin didn’t 
satisfy the statutory requirement of the debt’s connection to the 
purchase of property in “that what he received was something 
other than normal commercial property .... The ‘property’ argument 
simply overemphasizes the significance of the chips. As a matter 
of substance, chips in isolation are not what petitioner pur-
chased.”262 Instead, the Tax Court determined Zarin obtained an 
“opportunity to gamble.”263 The chips “were a medium of ex-
change within the Resorts casino, and in that sense, they were a 
substitute for cash, just as Federal Reserve Notes, checks, or 
other convenient means of representing credit balances consti-
tute or substitute for cash.”264 The chips Zarin received simply 
were not the “normal commercial property,”265 to which section 
108(e)(5) was intended to apply to.266 As discussed infra, Judge 
Stapleton, in his Third Circuit dissenting opinion, raised an 
alternative ground for why the section was not appropriate in 
Zarin; the section can only function when the taxpayer still 
holds the property in question when the settlement occurred.267
Thus, even if the gambling chips constituted the type of property 
that section 108(e)(5) was intended to cover, Zarin did not pos-
sess them at settlement, which eliminated the basis reduction 
quid pro quo intended by Congress.268
260 Id. at 1097. 
261 Id. (citing S. Rep. No. 96-1035 (1980), 1980-2 C.B. 620, 628). 
262 Id. at 1099. 
263 Id.
264 Id. at 1100. 
265 Id. at 1099. 
266 See S. Rep. No. 96-1035 (1980), 1980-2 C.B. 620, 628. 
267 Zarin v. Comm’r, 916 F.2d 110, 118 n.3 (3d Cr. 1990) (Stapleton, J., dis-
senting).
268 See S. Rep. No. 96-1035 (1980), 1980-2 C.B. 620, 628. 
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 Judge Tannenwald made it clear at the beginning of his 
dissenting opinion that it was “unnecessary to rely on Kerbaugh-
Empire.”269 Instead, he observed that Zarin is unlike all other 
decisions involving COD income wherein “the taxpayer had, in a 
prior year when the indebtedness was created, received a non-
taxable benefit clearly measurable in monetary terms which would 
remain untaxed if the subsequent cancellation of the indebtedness 
were held to be tax free.”270 While this reference seems to apply the 
loan proceeds approach, like the majority opinion the methodology 
utilized was not consistent. Later in the opinion he referred to the 
“freeing of assets” theory when he wrote that, “I think it signifi-
cant that because the debts involved herein were unenforceable 
from the moment that they were created, there was no freeing up 
of petitioners’ assets when they were discharged ... and therefore 
there was no increase in petitioners’ wealth that could constitute 
income.”271 He also referred to a “freeing of asset approach” in 
conjunction with the discussion of Kerbaugh-Empire.272
 His view was apparently that Zarin didn’t receive the 
functional equivalent of $3.435 million from Resorts.273 In a 
footnote, he remarks that “I think it clear that, although theo-
retically the chips could have been redeemed for cash instead of 
being used for gambling, any attempt by Mr. Zarin to follow this 
path would have been known to Resorts’ personnel and strongly 
resisted.”274 What if Zarin, not implausibly, got help with his 
addiction, and decided it was time to cash in his chips? Would 
Zarin, an educated engineer and successful businessman, un-
doubtedly familiar with capable lawyers, not be able to do so? 
This assertion by Judge Tannenwald was certainly questionable. 
 Judge Tannenwald also remarked that “[t]he concept that 
petitioner received his money’s worth from the enjoyment of using 
the chips (thus equating the pleasure of gambling with increase in 
wealth) produces the incongruous result that the more a gam-
bler loses, the greater his pleasure and the larger the increase in 
269 Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1101 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting). He does however note 
“that it does not follow from ‘the freeing of asset’ approach ... that Kerbaugh-
Empire is moribund for all purposes.” Id.
270 Id.
271 Id. at 1103 (citation omitted). 
272 Id. at 1101. 
273 Id.
274 Id. at 1101 n.1. 
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his wealth.”275 Professor Babette B. Barton provided a very astute 
response, stating that  
[t]he fact is, however, that a similar incongruity tends to take 
shape whenever losses suffered by a debtor motivate the creditor 
to excuse the debtor’s obligation .... The size of the canceled 
debt ... bears a positive correlation to increased losses of the 
debtor. A less than economically-thriving debtor seems the 
most likely candidate of COD income.276
 Judge Tannenwald also argued that the debt was unen-
forceable in New Jersey,277 and as such, the fact that Zarin “in-
tended to repay the full amount at the time the debt was created 
is ... irrelevant.”278 He rejected the significance of Flamingo Re-
sort, Inc. v. United States,279 a case cited by the Service and Tax 
Court majority, which held “that unenforceability under Nevada 
law did not nullify the ‘all events test,’ so as to avoid accruability by 
a casino of accounts receivables ... from gambling patrons.”280 He as-
serted that the case was predicated on the fact that there was 
“reasonable expectancy of collection,” which was not the case 
with Zarin.281
He believed it “obvious that Mr. Zarin would resist any at-
tempt to collect[ which was demonstrated by t]he fact that such 
resistance actually occurred ....”282 Another distinction he con-
tended, which is certainly valid, is that Flamingo Resort “dealt 
with the accruability of income to the casino; here the issue is 
the existence of income when a gambling debt is discharged.”283
 Judge Tannenwald also thought the contested liability 
doctrine relevant.284 He asserted that “I do not read ... language 
[in N. Sobel and elsewhere] as requiring that Kirby Lumber 
275 Id. at 1101 (footnote omitted). 
276 Barton, supra note 168, at 770. 
277 Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1101–03 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting). 
278 Id. at 1101. 
279 Flamingo Resort, Inc. v. United States, 664 F.2d 1387, 1390–91 (9th 
Cir. 1982). 
280 Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1102 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting). 
281 Id. at 1102–03. 
282 Id.
283 Id.
284 Id. at 1104. 
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must apply unless the amount is unliquidated, where there is a 
genuine dispute as to the underlying liability.”285
 Professor Seto, whose perspective was that of being one of 
Zarin’s lawyers for the Third Circuit appeal,286 was relatively 
positive regarding Judge Tannenwald’s dissent.287 While he ac-
knowledged that “Tannenwald’s analysis can be criticized as 
technically inadequate[ ] ... [and] that [it] did not offer a sophis-
ticated technical resolution of any of the difficult issues the case 
raised,”288 Professor Seto defended Judge Tannenwald for “ap-
pealing to common sense ....”289 This included, according to Pro-
fessor Seto,290 Judge Tannenwald’s being troubled with “the 
incongruous result that the more a gambler loses, the greater 
his pleasure and the larger the increase in his wealth.”291 Pro-
fessor Seto was comfortable with Judge “Tannenwald ... rely[ing] 
on the traditional rule that debt must be enforceable to be ‘debt’ 
and on a simple interpretation of the disputed debt exception to 
justify his conclusion that Zarin did not recognize discharge of 
indebtedness income in 1981.”292 As discussed further infra, this 
writer does not share the opinion of Professors Seto, Zelenak and 
some other commentators that essentially Judge Tannenwald got 
it right in Zarin.293
 Judge Jacobs noted in his separate dissenting opinion that 
the obligation to Resorts was invalid and unenforceable.294 As a 
result, he would hold it to be “void ab initio, and therefore, ... 
[Zarin] realized income ... in 1980 ... to the extent of the value of 
285 Id.
286 See Seto, supra note 213, at 1764. 
287 See id. at 1786. 
288 Id.
289 Id. at 1785. 
290 Id.
291 Zarin v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1084, 1101 (1989) (Tannenwald, J., dissenting). 
292 See Seto, supra note 213, at 1785–86. Professor Seto was critical of the 
Tax Court opinion writing that “[t]he majority’s conclusions that a discharge of 
unenforceable gambling debt was taxable and that the disputed debt exception 
only applied to unliquidated debt were both contrary to precedent—albeit skimpy 
precedent. Its reading of § 108(e)(5), as Judge Ruwe’s dissenting opinion 
would demonstrate, violated conventional canons of statutory construction.” 
Id. at 1777. 
293 See supra notes 106–07. 
294 Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1105 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). 
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the chips received.”295 Professor Seto was critical of this approach 
because pursuant to James v. United States,296 “a taxpayer may 
be charged with income on the receipt of funds if and only if he 
received those funds ‘without the consensual recognition, express 
or implied, of an obligation to repay.’”297 Zarin clearly had not 
met this standard.298
 Judge Jacobs’s analysis from this point became even more 
problematic. First, he “[would] hold that the amount of petition-
er’s losses from wagering activities in 1980 equaled or exceeded 
the amount of chip income. [i.e., the $3.435 million of gambling 
credit Zarin received in 1980 from Resorts, without an enforcea-
ble obligation to repay.]”299 Despite recognizing that section 165(d) 
by its terms “limits losses from wagering transactions to the extent 
of gains,”300 he found the provision germane.301 Judge Jacobs’s 
justification was that “the chip income constitutes gain from a 
wagering transaction, because no such income would have been 
realized but for the wagering transactions in which petitioner’s 
losses occurred.”302
 Judge Jacobs also criticized the Tax Court majority opin-
ion for determining Zarin had COD income in 1981, stating that 
“[f]or interest on indebtedness to be deductible under section 
163, it is well recognized that the indebtedness must be enforce-
able. ... [The same rule should apply to] the inclusion of dis-
charge of indebtedness income.”303 He simply ignored the fact 
that the provisions regarding what is included in gross income and 
what is deductible are often not symmetrical. Finally, he seemed 
to hint at a Kerbaugh-Empire rationale when he quoted from 
Hall that “[i]n deciding the income tax effects of cancellation of 
295 Id. at 1105–06. 
296 James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961). 
297 See Seto, supra note 213, at 1786 (citing James, 366 U.S. at 219). Pro-
fessor Seto also pointed out that this standard applies “regardless of whether 
the obligation was enforceable.” Id. (citing Liddy v. Comm’r, 808 F.2d 312,314 
(4th Cir. 1986)). Professor Seto had other issues with Judge Jacobs’s approach 
including its impossibility to administer. Id.
298 See id. at 1786–87. 




303 Id. at 1106–07. 
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indebtedness for less than its face amount, a court need not in every 
case be oblivious to the net effect of the entire transaction.”304
 Judge Ruwe’s dissent, which four other judges joined, fo-
cused on their view that section 108(e)(5) was applicable.305 One 
commentator indicated that his dissent “from a purely technical 
standpoint[ was] probably the best legal argument applied to the 
Zarin facts,”306 although, this writer believes section 108(e)(5) was 
improper for Zarin on two separate grounds mentioned above and 
elaborated on infra, and neither court found the section relevant.307
 Judge Ruwe acknowledged that apart from the question 
of section 108(e)(5)’s applicability, he “agree[d] with much of the 
majority’s reasoning ....”308 He argued that “[t]he parties stipu-
lated that the chips were ‘property[ ]’ ... [and that i]t is beyond 
question that gambling chips constitute what is commonly re-
ferred to as property.”309 He took issue with “[t]he majority’s 
legal conclusion [that] seems to be that gambling chips, being 
other than ‘normal commercial property’ [in their judgment], do 
not constitute ‘property’ within the meaning of section 108(e)(5).”310
Judge Ruwe asserted that with respect to section 108(e)(5), “nei-
ther the statute nor the accompanying legislative history qualify 
or restrict the term ‘property.’ No attempt has been made to 
specify any limits on the scope of the term. Instead, the term is 
used in a broad, comprehensive manner.”311 He was (in this 
writer’s opinion incorrectly) derisive of the Service’s position 
that “[a] purchase price adjustment [under 108(e)(5)] occurs 
when the dispute involves contract liability for the purchase of 
304 Id. at 1107 (citing United States v. Hall, 307 F.2d 238, 242 (10th Cir. 1962)). 
305 Id. at 1107–16 (Ruwe, J. dissenting). 
306 Jon D. Rigney, Zarin v. Commissioner: The Continuing Validity of Case 
Law Exceptions to Discharge of Indebtedness Income, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 981, 
990 (1991). He did, however, acknowledge that “[t]here are ... sound policy 
considerations, explored in the analysis of the Third Circuit opinion, for not 
applying the argument [that section 108(e)(5) excluded the debt discharge 
from gross income.]” Id. at 990 n.72. 
307 See id. at 990–94; supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text; infra Sec-
tion II.E. 
308 Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1107 (Ruwe, J., dissenting). 
309 Id. at 1108. 
310 Id.
311 Id. at 1111. 
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an asset.”312 He wrote that “I am unable to discern any basis or 
rationale for this argument.”313
 He concluded that:  
The majority decides an issue of first impression by disregard-
ing the plain language of the statute without any justification 
in the statute or legislative history .... I would dispose of this 
case by assuming that there was discharge of indebtedness 
income. I would then apply section 108(e)(5) to treat the dis-
charge as a purchase price adjustment.314
 After losing in Tax Court, Zarin fired his lawyers from 
Reid & Priest and retained new counsel at Caplin & Drysdale, 
which filed for a rehearing at Tax Court.315 The grounds for the 
rehearing motion were primarily based on Zarin being exempt 
under the insolvency exception to section 108, section 108(a)(1)(B), 
although his original counsel had conceded he was solvent.316
When the motion was denied,317 Zarin changed lawyers once 
again for his appeal to the Third Circuit.318 This time, with law-
yers from Drinker & Biddle, he hit the jackpot, but did lose the 
dice roll in a malpractice suit he filed against Reid & Priest.319
B. Third Circuit Opinion 
 The Third Circuit reversed the Tax Court and held for the 
taxpayer.320 Professor Seto observed that “[i]n substance, the 
Third Circuit majority opinion mirrored Tannenwald’s; it held, 
in effect, that Zarin had not received $3.435 million in value and 
that the discharge was exempt because Zarin’s debt was unen-
forceable and disputed.”321 While many, but not all, pundits ap-
plaud the outcome, the court’s opinion has been subject to sharp 
312 Id. at 1115. 
313 Id.
314 Id. at 1115–16. 
315 See Schenk, supra note 12, at 167 n.21. 
316 See Seto, supra note 213, at 1791. 
317 Zarin v. Comm’r, 916 F.2d 110, 112 n.6 (3d Cir. 1990). 
318 See Schenk, supra note 12, at 167 n.91. 
319 Id.
320 Zarin, 916 F.2d at 117. 
321 Seto, supra note 213, at 1791. 
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rebuke.322 This writer is critical of the Third Circuit’s reasoning 
as well as its conclusion. Essentially, the Third Circuit held that 
Zarin was not subject to tax for two reasons, either of which 
(according to the Third Circuit) would have served to nullify COD 
income. First, Section 108(d)(1)’s definition of the term “indebt-
edness of the taxpayer” was not satisfied, therefor “the cancelation 
of indebtedness provisions of the Code [did] not apply to the set-
tlement between Resorts and Zarin."323 Second, the contested 
liability (disputed debt) doctrine was applicable because the debt 
was determined to be unenforceable.324
 The Circuit Court initially determined “that sections 108 
and 61(a)(12) were inapplicable ....”325 In reaching these findings, 
the court indicated that it looked to section 108(d)(1) as to what 
indebtedness meant in section 61(a)(12) because the term was not 
defined in section 61.326 Having done so, the court stated that “[i]n 
order to come within the sweep of the discharge of indebtedness 
rules, ... the [taxpayer] must show that one of the two prongs in 
the section 108(d)(1) test is satisfied. Zarin satisfies neither.”327
 Section 108(d)(1) provides that “[f]or purposes of this section, 
the term ‘indebtedness of the taxpayer’ means any indebtedness—
(A) for which the taxpayer is liable, or (B) subject to which the 
taxpayer holds property.”328 The court then focused on the first 
of the alternatives for “indebtedness of the taxpayer” and found 
that “[b]ecause the debt Zarin owed to Resorts was unenforceable 
as a matter of New Jersey state law, it is clearly not a debt ‘for 
which the taxpayer is liable.’”329 While, as explained in Judge 
Stapleton’s dissent, this determination should only be academic, 
322 See, e.g., Shaviro, supra note 11, at 258. That “[g]iven the serious prob-
lems with the Third Circuit’s reasoning, one fervently hopes that it will fail to 
live on as precedent for any broad proposition of tax law.” Id.
323 Zarin, 916 F.2d at 114. 
324 Id.
325 Id. at 113. 
326 Id.
327 Id.
328 I.R.C. § 108(d)(1). 
329 Zarin, 916 F.2d at 113 (footnote omitted). In an accompanying footnote, 
the Third Circuit noted, in part, that “[t]he Tax Court held that the Commis-
sioner had not met its burden of proving that the debt owed Resorts was 
enforceable as a matter of state law .... There was ample evidence to support 
the finding.” Id. at 113 n.7. 
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this writer believes it was in error. Professor Babette B. Barton 
observed that “[t]he correctness of this interpretation is at the 
least questionable in light of the Supreme Court’s expressed 
attitudes about the immateriality for tax purposes of whether a 
debtor is or is not personally liable for a debt.”330 Professor 
Musselman characterized the court’s analysis here as “most 
surely incorrect.”331
 As to the alternative definition of “indebtedness of the 
taxpayer” under section 108(d)(1)(B), the court found that “Zarin 
did not have a debt subject to which he held property as re-
quired by section 108(d)(1)(B).”332 In doing so, as noted above, 
the court implicitly rejected Judge Ruwe’s argument in dissent 
and endorsed the Tax Court finding “that gambling chips were 
not property, but rather, ‘a medium of exchange within the Re-
sorts casino’ and a ‘substitute for cash.’”333 That is, “the chips 
[are] nothing more than ‘the opportunity to gamble ....’”334 The 
court further buttressed its conclusion that the chips should not 
be regarded as property for purposes of section 108(d)(1)(B) by 
asserting that “[e]ven were there no relevant legislative pro-
nouncement [referring to a New Jersey statute referenced above] on 
which to rely, simple common sense would lead to the conclusion 
that chips were not property in Zarin’s hands.”335 The court pointed 
out that “Zarin could not do with the chips as he pleased, nor did 
the chips have any independent economic value beyond the casi-
no. The chips themselves were of little use to Zarin, other than 
as a means of facilitating gambling.”336 While not addressed by 
the Third Circuit, even if the gambling chips constituted property 
within the meaning of the statutory provision (which this writer 
330 Barton, supra note 168, at 754–55 (footnote omitted). 
331 Musselman, supra note 6, at 617 (footnote omitted). 
332 Zarin, 916 F.2d at 113. 
333 Id.
334 Id. The Third Circuit embellished its argument by citing a New Jersey 
statute that provided that “gaming chips in New Jersey during 1980 were 
regarded ‘solely as evidence of a debt owed to their custodian by the casino 
licensee and shall be considered at no time the property of anyone other than 
the casino licensee issuing them.’” Id. at 114 (citing N.J. Admin. Code tit. 
19k, § 19:46-1.5(d) (1990)). 
335 Id.
336 Id.
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believes would have been incorrect), the taxpayer would not satisfy 
the requirement in section 108(d)(1)(B) that the taxpayer “holds
property.”337 The chips were gone when Zarin settled.338 Judge 
Stapleton’s observation, in his dissenting opinion that “[s]ection 
108(d) expressly defines that term solely for purposes of § 108 
and not for purposes of § 61(a)(12),”339 should make the forego-
ing analysis moot, i.e., even if met, the requirements of section 
108(d)(1)(A) (which this writer and many scholars believe he 
had) or section 108(d)(1)(B) (which it is fairly clear he did not), 
this should not mean he had COD income. Conversely, a failure 
to meet both requirements should not have served to relieve him 
of COD income. 
 A major focus of the Third Circuit opinion was on the Tax 
Court’s determination that the debt was unenforceable.340 It was 
critical to the Third Circuit’s finding, albeit mistaken, that sec-
tion 108(d)(1)(A) was inapplicable.341 The Third Circuit also de-
cided that the contested liability doctrine was relevant because 
the debt was deemed to be unenforceable.342 The Tax Court was 
correct in determining that lack of enforceability of the debt does 
not serve to shield COD income.343 As Professor Shaviro ob-
served “[t]he lack of legal enforceability hardly seems relevant 
here.”344 The focus of the Third Circuit “should [have been] 
whether the parties intended to create a debt.”345 As discussed 
below, the post-Zarin Tenth Circuit decision in Preslar supported 
this view that “[e]nforceability of the debt ... should not affect the 
tax treatment of the transaction.”346 In fixating on the enforcea-
bility rabbit hole, the Third Circuit failed to focus on some key 
337 I.R.C. § 108(d)(1)(B) (emphasis added). 
338 Zarin, 916 F.2d at 112, rev’g 92 T.C. 1084 (1989). 
339 Id. at 118 n.3 (Stapleton, J., dissenting). 
340 Id. at 113. 
341 Id.
342 Id. at 115. 
343 Zarin v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1084, 1094–95 (1989). 
344 See Shaviro, supra note 11, at 243. 
345 Douglas E. Kulper, Taxpayer Rolls the Dice and the IRS Craps out: 
Forgiveness of Gambling Debts is Not Income in Zarin v. Commissioner, 1991 
UTAH L. REV. 617, 636 (1991). 
346 Preslar v. Comm’r, 167 F.3d 1323, 1329 (10th Cir. 1999), rev’g & rem’g
TC Memo 1996-543 (1996). 
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Tax Court findings about the genuine debtor-creditor relation-
ship Zarin had with Resorts. This included that the Tax Court 
determined that “[a]t all times pertinent hereto [presumably up 
to the time of Resorts’ lawsuit], petitioner intended to ... pay 
Resorts in full ....”347 Furthermore, there was no indication that 
when Resorts extended Zarin’s credit, it did not expect to be re-
paid.348 In fact, Zarin had previously paid in full gambling debts 
to Resorts of $2.5 million.349
 With respect to its alternative grounds for finding Zarin 
did not have COD income, i.e., the use of the contested liability (also 
known as disputed debt) doctrine, the Third Circuit explained 
that “[u]nder the contested liability doctrine, if a taxpayer, in 
good faith, disputed the amount of a debt, a subsequent settle-
ment of the dispute would be treated as the amount of debt cog-
nizable for tax purposes.”350
 The Third Circuit opinion rejected the Service’s and Tax 
Court’s position that the contested liability doctrine has no appli-
cation to the case at bar because “Zarin’s debt was liquidated ....”351
The Third Circuit’s position was that “[w]hen a debt is unen-
forceable, it follows that the amount of the debt, and not just the 
liability thereon, is in dispute.”352 Furthermore, the court stated 
that “[the] dollar value to each chip ... is not beyond dispute ....”353
The court contended that “[i]f indeed the only issue was the en-
forceability of the entire debt there would have been no settle-
ment .... Such a debt cannot be called liquidated, since its exact 
amount was not fixed until settlement.”354 The court’s position 
was subject to strong criticism by the Tenth Circuit in Preslar 
for failure to distinguish a liquid debt obligation from an illiquid 
one.355
347 Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1086. 
348 Id. 
349 Id. at 1087. 
350 Zarin v. Comm’r, 916 F.2d 110, 115 (3d Cir. 1990), rev’g 92 T.C. 1084 (1989). 




355 Preslar v. Comm’r, 167 F.3d 1323, 1327–29 (10th Cir. 1999), rev’g & 
rem’g TC Memo 1996-543 (1996). 
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 The Third Circuit’s position on the application of the con-
tested liability doctrine to Zarin was also undercut by a fallacious 
example offered by the court: 
Thus, if a taxpayer took out a loan for $10,000, refused in good 
faith to pay the full $10,000 back, and then reached an agreement 
with the lendor that he would pay back only $7,000 in full sat-
isfaction of the debt, the transaction would be treated as if the 
initial loan was $7,000. When the taxpayer tenders the $7,000 
payment, he will have been deemed to have paid the full amount 
of the initially disputed debt. Accordingly, there is no tax con-
sequence to the taxpayer upon payment.356
The $3,000 should be treated as COD income.357 Profes-
sors Kahn and Kahn commented that Third Circuit’s “conclusion 
[of its example] is incorrect.”358 They reasoned that “[t]he bor-
rower obtained $10,000 cash and returned only $7,000. The $3,000 
cash he received that was not included in his income because of the 
debt is now free from any liability.”359 Therefore, “[r]egardless of 
what legitimate reasons there might be for the borrower to not 
be liable for part of that debt, the borrower must include $3,000 
in income when that amount of the debt is cancelled.”360 Profes-
sor Seto, commenting on why the Third Circuit opinion was not 
given much respect by scholars, noted that “[a]ll well-trained tax 
lawyers know that [the Third Circuit example] is ‘wrong’ .... The 
effect of the explanation ... was to destroy the credibility of what 
might otherwise have been a plausible opinion.”361 Professor 
Seto, however, appears to be one of the few commentators who 
would characterize the Third Circuit analysis as even close to a 
plausible opinion.362
 The contested liability doctrine was simply not appropri-
ate to the facts of Zarin. There was no dispute that Resorts 
loaned Zarin $3.435 million.363 If Zarin had changed his mind 
356 Zarin, 916 F.2d at 115. 




361 Seto, supra note 213, at 1792. 
362 See Kulper, supra note 345, at 642; Kahn & Kahn, supra note 3, at 205–
06; Shaviro, supra note 11, at 253–54. 
363 See Zarin v. Comm’r, 916 F.2d 110, 112 (3d Cir. 1990), rev’g 92 T.C. 
1084 (1989). 
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about gambling away the proceeds, after perhaps getting help 
for his addiction, he could have cashed in his chips and used the 
proceeds to extinguish his debt to the extent of the dollar value 
of the chips.364 (He in fact, got such help but only after his set-
tlement with Resorts).365 Alternatively, Zarin could have ex-
changed his chips when he was on a winning streak. Under both 
of those circumstances, the amount of the debt would be clearly 
equal to the chips which he was entitled to receive, $3.435 mil-
lion. As to why the parties settled for $500,000, perhaps Resorts 
believed that they could not recover anymore from him given his 
financial position and decided to forego additional litigation ex-
pense. The parties may have instead reached a consensus that 
the odds of a court finding the debt was enforceable was unlikely, 
but not impossible. As Judge Stapleton described it in his dis-
senting position, “Resorts settled for 14 cents on the dollar pre-
sumably because it viewed such a settlement as reflective of the 
odds that the debt would be held to be enforceable.”366 Professor 
Barton posited as another possible reason: Resort’s concern 
about adverse publicity.367 It could have been a combination of 
some or all of these reasons. The fact that the matter was settled 
for substantially less than the agreed terms of the original loan 
does not mean that the parties disagreed as to the amount of the 
original indebtedness. They did not and the debt, therefore, 
should be liquid. The settlement did not change a liquid debt to 
an illiquid one. 
 There was also a policy reason as to why the Third Cir-
cuit’s position on the application of the contested liability doc-
trine to Zarin made no sense. One commentator pointed out that 
if this position were widely adopted, then “parties will always 
364 Professor Seto pointed out: 
New Jersey law prohibited the redemption of a credit gambler’s 
chips for cash or their removal from the casino, requiring that 
they first be applied against the gambler’s outstanding credit 
balance. In effect, the only thing Zarin could have done with 
his chips was to pay down his unenforceable debt.
Seto, supra note 213, at 1792. 
365 Professor Seto reported that Zarin “joined Gamblers Anonymous and 
became Chair of the Advisory Board to the National Foundation for the Study of 
Pathological Gambling. He never gambled again.” Id. at 1761 (footnotes omitted). 
366 Zarin, 916 F.2d at 118 (Stapleton, J., dissenting). 
367 See Barton, supra note 168, at 764. 
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invoke the disputed debt doctrine to avoid taxation. Thus, taxation 
of [COD income from] unenforceable debts will cease. This result 
[would] clearly [serve to] frustrate[ ] ... the will of Congress.”368
 In its argument as to why the contested liability doctrine 
should pertain to Zarin, the Third Circuit also examined and 
cited with approval the Tenth Circuit decision in Hall, discussed 
above.369 The Third Circuit stated that:
In effect, the [Tenth Circuit in Hall] held that because the 
debt was unenforceable, the amount of the loss and resulting 
debt cognizable for tax purposes were fixed by the settlement 
at $148,110. Thus, the Tenth Circuit lent its endorsement to 
the contested liability doctrine in a factual situation strikingly 
similar to the one at issue.370
 The Third Circuit rejected the Service’s argument that 
“the decision in Hall was based on United States Supreme Court 
precedent since overruled, and therefore Hall should be disre-
garded. Indeed, the Hall court devoted a considerable amount of 
time to Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire ..., a case whose validity is in 
question.”371 The Third Circuit responded that, without deciding 
whether Kerbaugh-Empire is still valid, “Hall relied on [Kerbaugh-
Empire] only for the proposition that ‘a court need not in every 
case be oblivious to the net effect of the entire transaction.’”372
 The later Tenth Circuit decision, Preslar, discussed infra,
certainly marginalized Hall.373 There the court stated: 
Whether Hall has continued viability is questionable in light of 
the Supreme Court’s holding in Tufts. The emphasis on a tax-
payer’s lack of legal obligation to pay a gambling debt in Hall is 
difficult to reconcile with Tuft’s disregard of the nonrecourse 
nature of a loan in calculating gross income.374
 While there was relatively little discussion by the Third 
Circuit regarding theories as to when COD income should or should 
368 Kulper, supra note 345, at 642. 
369 See Zarin, 916 F.2d at 115–16.
370 Id.
371 Id. at 116 n.11. 
372 Id. (citing United States v. Hall, 307 F.2d 238, 242 (10th Cir. 1962)). 
373 See Preslar v. Comm’r, 167 F.3d 1323, 1329 (10th Cir. 1999). 
374 Id.
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not arise, it relied upon and quoted N. Sobel that “the note for-
given by the bank ‘was not the occasion for a freeing of assets
and that there was no gain ....’”375 Its citation and discussion of 
Hall could also be construed as embracing the freeing of assets 
approach.376 As discussed below, Professor Chad J. Pomeroy was 
of the view that the Third Circuit implicitly utilized the freeing 
of assets methodology.377
 In a generally well-reasoned and cogent dissent, Third 
Circuit Judge Stapleton, without expressly referring to the loan 
proceeds theory, effectively utilized this approach (despite some 
language suggestive of the freeing of assets methodology) in finding 
Zarin had COD income in 1981.378 Judge Stapleton stated that 
[d]espite the fact that Zarin received in 1980 cash or an enti-
tlement worth $3.4 million,379 he correctly reported in that year 
no income from his dealings with Resorts. He did so solely be-
cause he recognized, as evidenced by his notes, an offsetting 
obligation to repay Resorts $3.4 million in cash.380
With the settlement in 1981, Judge Stapleton reasoned, “Resorts 
surrendered its claim to repayment of the remaining $2.9 mil-
lion of the money Zarin had borrowed. As of that time, Zarin’s 
assets were freed of his potential liability for that amount and 
he recognized gross income in that amount.”381 Judge Stapleton 
indicated that the alternative of finding that Zarin did not have 
income is “unacceptable as inconsistent with the fundamental 
principle of the Code that anything of commercial value received 
by a taxpayer is taxable unless expressly excluded from gross 
income.”382 The other option, i.e., to tax Zarin in 1980 (that was 
suggested by Judge Jacobs in his Tax Court dissenting opinion) 
375 Zarin, 916 F.2d at 115 (citing N. Sobel, Inc. v. Comm’r, 40 B.T.A. 1263, 
1265 (1939)) (emphasis added). 
376 See Pomeroy, supra note 74, at 1694–95. 
377 Id. at 1695. 
378 See Zarin, 916 F.2d at 117 (Stapleton, J., dissenting).
379 This amount, also referred to in the majority opinion, id. at 116, is ap-
parently rounded version of the actual $3.435 million figure. Id at 117 (cita-
tions omitted). 
380 Id. (citations omitted). 
381 Id. (citations omitted). 
382 Id. at 118 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). 
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was, according to Judge Stapleton, “unacceptable as impractica-
ble.”383 He explained that:  
[i]n 1980, neither party was maintaining that the debt was 
unenforceable and, because of the settlement, its unenforcea-
bility was not even established in the litigation over the debt 
in 1981. It was not until 1989, in this litigation over the tax 
consequences of the transaction, that the unenforceability was 
first judicially declared.384
Judge Stapleton concluded that in his view “where something that 
would otherwise be includable in gross income is received ... there 
should be no recognition of income so long as the debtor continues to 
recognize an obligation to repay the debt.”385 He added that, “in-
come, if not earlier recognized, should be recognized when the debt-
or no longer recognizes an obligation to repay and the creditor 
has released the debt or acknowledged its unenforceability.”386
 Judge Stapleton used a footnote to address the lack of rel-
evance of sections 108(e)(5) and 108(d)(1).387 As to section 
108(e)(5), he stated that “[a]mong other things, § 108(e)(5) nec-
essarily applies only to a situation in which the debtor still holds 
the property acquired in the purchase money transaction.”388 As 
to the absence of significance of section 108(d)(1) to Zarin, Judge 
Stapleton indicated that the literal language of the provision 
should apply, i.e., the definition provided is “[f]or purposes of 
this section ....”389 He wrote, “[e]qually irrelevant is § 108(d)’s 
definition of ‘indebtedness’ relied upon heavily by the court. Sec-
tion 108(d) expressly defines that term solely for the purposes of 
§ 108 and not for the purposes of § 61(a)(12).”390 While moot if 
one accepts the Third Circuit majority findings that Zarin did 
not meet either section 108(d)(1)(A) “[indebtedness] for which 
the taxpayer is liable” (a very dubious judgment) and section 




386 Id. (footnote omitted). 
387 See id. at 118 n.3.
388 Id. He did not address whether he believed the chips were “property” 
for this purpose, presumably because he thought it moot. Id.
389 I.R.C. § 108(d)(1). 
390 Zarin, 916 F.2d at 118 n.3 (Stapleton, J., dissenting). 
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held property as required by section 108(d)(1)(B),”391 the scholars 
are divided as to Judge Stapleton’s reasoning as to the limited 
scope of section 108(d)(1).392
 Professor Shaviro found merit in Judge Stapleton’s as-
sessment.393 He noted that:
Section 61(a) is a provision of broad inclusion, listing items 
within the ambit of gross income, while § 108 serves to carve 
out specific exceptions to the broad reach of § 61(a). It is plau-
sible that only a subset of all cancellation of indebtedness in-
come, conceived in the broadest sense, would be made eligible 
for the carveout.394
Professor Dodge apparently concurred,395 as does this writer. 
This, however, was disputed by Professor Seto, who stated that  
[t]he history of § 108 and its predecessor sections strongly sug-
gests that it was intended to address whatever ‘debt’ might 
otherwise be subject to the discharge of indebtedness doc-
trine. ... [Section] 61(a)(12) was apparently added only for 
purposes of completeness and has never previously been con-
strued as having independent substantive effect.396
Professor Seto added that “[t]o hold that § 61(a)(12) encom-
passes discharges of unenforceable debt but that § 108 does not 
would lead to very peculiar results. A discharge of unenforceable 
debt, for example, would be income, but would be ineligible for 
the statutory insolvency exception of I.R.C. § 108(a).”397
391 Id. at 113. Zarin’s failure to satisfy section 108(d)(1)(B) is self-evident, 
i.e., he did not possess the chips when the debt was settled. Id.
392 See Shaviro, supra note 11, at 253; Dodge, supra note 19, at 677–78; 
Seto, supra note 213, at 1792. 
393 See Shaviro, supra note 11, at 253. Professor Musselman also agreed. 
See Musselman, supra note 6, at 617. 
394 Shaviro, supra note 11, at 253. 
395 See Dodge, supra note 19, at 677–78 (“The parameters of [COD] income 
are determined neither by § 108 nor the § 61 regulations, but rather by the 
evolving ‘common law’ of gross income.”). Professor Barton also appeared to 
be in agreement, when she wrote that “[a] determination of the inapplicabil-
ity of section 108 to the unenforceable gambling debt should have shifted the 
inquiry to why the discharge occurred, and to whether a discharge for that 
reason amounted to a taxable accession to wealth.” Barton, supra note 168, at 
755 (footnote omitted). 
396 Seto, supra note 213, at 1792 n. 199. 
397 Id.
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 As an aside, Professor Shaviro thought that one of the 
several failings with the Third Circuit’s reasoning was that even 
if Zarin’s income was determined to be excluded from being 
treated as COD income, he could still be taxed under the broad 
reach of section 61.398 He argued that “[w]hen a taxpayer re-
ceives something of value in a commercial setting, the govern-
ment does not have the burden to show what type of income it 
constitutes.”399 That is, assuming arguendo that Zarin did not 
meet the requirements of section 108(d)(1)(A) or (B) and that 
such failure applied to whether he had income under then sec-
tion 61(a)(12), he could still be found to have taxable income in 
1981 from the settlement.400
C. Scholarly Commentary 
 Professors Chirelstein and Zelenak wrote that “[o]nly a 
grouch would object to the outcome in Zarin.”401 According to 
Professor Schenk “[t]he vast majority of commentators think that 
Zarin did not have COD income.”402 Defending the Tax Court’s 
decision that he should be taxed is somewhat daunting in light 
of the forgoing and that he is a somewhat sympathetic figure 
who lost a sizeable amount of money from pursuing the adrena-
line rush of gambling that was certainly encouraged by Resorts. 
Furthermore, given his 70% tax bracket in 1981 he would have 
owed about $5.2 million, despite being out of pocket $500,000 
from the settlement with Resorts, had he lost his appeal.403
 As a start, it is useful to review some of the comments and 
arguments made by a few of the scholars regarding the Zarin
decisions. This writer’s brief snippets certainly do not do justice 
to some brilliant scholarship that was engendered by Zarin.
Professor Calvin Johnson, who vehemently disagreed that 
the contested liability/disputed debt doctrine was applicable to 
Zarin, utilized the Third Circuit’s flawed hypothetical to make his 
398 See Shaviro, supra note 11, at 253. 
399 See id.
400 See id.
401 CHIRELSTEIN & ZELENAK, supra note 27, at 64. 
402 Schenk, supra note 12, at 169 n.100. 
403 Id. at 167. 
590 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:537 
argument.404 He contended that “[t]here is ... a simple straightfor-
ward reason why Zarin should win: The 1981 forgiveness of his 
markers was a recovery of an expense for which Zarin had no prior 
tax benefit. Zarin has no income under the exclusionary, pro-
taxpayer branch of the tax benefit rule.”405 Professor Johnson 
stated that: 
[u]nder the exclusionary or pro-taxpayer branch of the tax benefit 
rule, a taxpayer may exclude the recovery of an expenditure from 
income, where the expenditure gave the taxpayer no prior tax 
benefit. The taxpayer may be viewed as, in effect, having a 
basis in the expenditure, which the taxpayer may use to shel-
ter the recovery from tax, provided the expenditure did not 
previously generate a tax savings.406
 Professor Johnson asserted that “Zarin had a recovery of 
his prior losses when he failed to pay for the chips gambled 
away in the prior years and the recovery was an exempt recov-
ery of an item without prior tax benefit.”407
 Professor Musselman would also find for Zarin (at least 
with respect to some, if not all, of the income),408 although he too 
had problems with the Third Circuit’s reasoning,409 but did not 
subscribe to Professor Johnson’s analysis.410 Under Professor 
Musselman’s proposed methodology for determining whether a 
taxpayer has COD income, discussed above,
it must simply be determined whether such discharge result-
ed in a clearly realized accession to the taxpayer’s wealth, and 
in what amount ... the amount of any such accession to wealth 
is determined by the value of anything the taxpayer received 
as a result of any such discharge of indebtedness ....411
Under his approach, normally in
404 Calvin H. Johnson, Zarin and the Tax Benefit Rule: Tax Models for 
Gambling Losses and the Forgiveness of Gambling Debts, 45 N.Y.U. TAX L.
REV. 697, 697–99 (1990). 
405 Id. at 697–98. 
406 Id. at 700–01. 
407 Id. at 706. 
408 See Musselman, supra note 6, at 644. 
409 See id. at 617–18. 
410 See id. at 630–31. 
411 Id. at 632–33 (footnotes omitted). 
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an arm’s length agreement to incur a debt in exchange for 
services should ... result in a legal presumption that the value 
of the services received by the taxpayer is equal to the amount 
the taxpayer agreed to pay for them, [but Zarin presented ex-
igent circumstances including his compulsive gambling and 
Resorts illegally extending him credit].412
These factors, Professor Musselman believed, “g[i]ve rise to a 
serious question of whether the taxpayer received value in a lesser 
amount than the debt incurred.”413
 Professors Kahn and Kahn believed Zarin should not have 
had COD income.414 They asserted that “[t]he cancellation of the 
debt in Zarin can be seen through the transactional approach as 
nothing more than a reduction of the cost of the gambling expe-
rience.”415 They reason “that the taxpayer never received any-
thing of value whose purchase price could not be adjusted when 
the amount of the debt was reduced.”416 They shared, with many 
other scholars, a negative view of the Third Circuit opinion, 
writing that “the Third Circuit advanced two independent ra-
tionales neither of which is convincing.”417
 Professor Stephen A. Zorn suggested viewing Zarin “from 
the point of view of the casino, and use its expected return in 
advancing the money to the taxpayer in Zarin as a measure of 
the amount gambled.”418 He believed that: 
the unenforceability of gambling debts (at least through the 
courts) would be a legitimate factor to consider, and a court 
might well reach the conclusion that, in advancing $3.4 mil-
lion of in-house gambling credit to the taxpayer, the casino in 
fact had a reasonable expectation of receiving not more than 
the $500,000 that it ultimately received ....419
412 Id. at 644 (footnote omitted). 
413 Id. (footnote omitted). 
414 See Kahn & Kahn, supra note 3, at 203–06. 
415 Id. at 206. 
416 Id. at 205. 
417 Id. at 203. 
418 Stephen A. Zorn, The Federal Income Tax Treatment of Gambling: Fairness 
or Obsolete Moralism?, 49 TAX L. 1, 33 (1995). 
419 Id.
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 Therefore, Professor Zorn was of the view that “there 
would be no discharge of indebtedness income.”420 One problem 
with this approach is that it requires a court to determine that 
Resorts never expected to be repaid the $3.435 million advanced 
to Zarin.421 One should not simply surmise that by settling on 
$500,000, that was what Resorts had intended at the time the 
credit was advanced. 
 Professor Alan Gunn indicated that “Zarin’s transactions 
with the casino are best characterized as the purchase of the 
opportunity to gamble for $500,000.”422 While Professor Gunn 
agreed with the Tax Court that section 108(e)(5) was inapt be-
cause there was no purchase of property, he believed that there 
is a non-statutory purchase price adjustment exception for ser-
vices that “could easily have been extended to cover a situation 
like Zarin’s.”423
 Professor Richard C.E. Beck thought the Third Circuit 
outcome was correct, but because “Zarin received neither money 
nor goods nor services, and because he received no consideration 
in exchange for his debt, he was left with nothing of value when the 
debt was canceled, and he should not be taxed.”424 He believed that 
since Resorts should never have extended Zarin credit, that “the 
parties should be put back into the positions they were in before 
420 Id.
421 See id.
422 Alan Gunn, Another Look at the Zarin Case, 50 TAX NOTES 893, 895 (1991). 
423 Id. at 895. Professor Seto is in accord. He observed that 
[a]t the trial court level, Zarin had not argued the nonstatutory 
purchase price adjustment exception, and the court therefore had 
no reason to address it. The nonstatutory exception, however, 
is not limited to “property.” Consider, for example, the follow-
ing scenario. A law firm sends Taxpayer a bill for $100,000 for 
nondeductible services. Although the firm might win if it sued 
for the $100,000 and although the client does not formally 
dispute the bill, discussions lead the firm to reduce its charges to 
$75,000 in what the real world would view as a purchase price ad-
justment. Under the nonstatutory exception, the partial dis-
charge does not result in income to the client, even though the 
services are clearly not “property.”
Seto, supra note 213, at 1785. 
424 Richard C.E. Beck, Cancellation of Debt and Other Incidental Items of 
Income: Puritan Tax Rules in the U.S., 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 695, 712 (2004/5) 
[hereinafter Cancellation of Debt]. 
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the transactions were entered into. ... [I.e.,] the gambling losses 
[should be] rescinded.”425 He equated Zarin to the contested liabil-
ity decision N. Sobel, the case cited by the Third Circuit in Zarin,
but whose application to liquidated debt (whether or not enforcea-
ble) was refuted in Preslar.426 Under Professor Beck’s reasoning,  
[i]f Sobel’s stock purchase had been for cash and the effect of 
rescission were a return of Sobel’s cash, it would be obvious 
that the reimbursement was simply a tax-free return of capital. 
The same is true for Zarin. Zarin simply got his money back, 
he gained nothing, and the casino lost nothing (except its 
hoped-for gain).427
 Professor Shaviro, who acknowledged that “Zarin is a 
case without a right answer,”428 would have held for the taxpayer 
“on the ground that there was no untaxed benefit because the 
settlement cost presumably equaled the expected purchase price 
given the ex-ante doubtfulness of repayment.”429 He too was very 
425 Id. at 713. 
426 See id. The Third Circuit reasoned that “[t]here is little difference be-
tween the present case [Zarin] and Sobel” and determined that “the transaction 
between Zarin and Resorts can be best characterized as ... contested liability,” 
thereby rejecting the Tax Court’s reasoning that contested liability was barred in 
Zarin. Zarin v. Comm’r, 916 F.2d 110, 115–16 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that Sobel
“stands for the proposition that ‘there must be a liquidated debt’”) (citing 
Colonial Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 85 T.C. 855, 862–63 (1985)); see also N. Sobel, 
Inc. v. Comm’r 40 B.T.A. 1263, 1265 (1939). The court in Preslar found that to 
“implicate the contested liability doctrine the original amount of debt must be 
unliquidated .... [not] the mere fact that the taxpayer challenges the enforcea-
bility of the debt.” Preslar v. Comm’r, 167 F.3d 1323, 1327–29 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(citing Comm’r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 311–13 (1983); N. Sobel, 40 B.T.A. at 
1263–65; Zarin, 916 F.2d at 115–16; Shaviro, supra note 11, at 256; Giangiordano, 
supra note 86, at 1202 n.88l). 
427 Cancellation of Debt, supra note 424, at 713. Zarin was still obviously 
out his $500,000 settlement. See Zarin, 916 F.2d at 112. 
428 Shaviro, supra note 11, at 250. 
429 Id. at 258 (footnote omitted). Professor Shaviro also expressed the view 
that ignoring the correct legal analysis, holding for Zarin would constitute 
the equitable result. He mused that:  
the belief that Zarin was too unfortunate to have $3 million of 
taxable income makes the Tax Court’s decision intuitively dis-
tasteful even if one agrees with it. Pity for Zarin’s plight is only 
one reason for the pro-taxpayer intuition, however. A second 
reason is the side of the ledger on which the issue arose: the 
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disparaging of the Third Circuit opinion.430 He stated that “[g]iven 
the serious problems with the Third Circuit’s reasoning, one 
fervently hopes that it will fail to live on as precedent for any 
broad proposition of tax law.”431
 Professor Joseph M. Dodge noted, near the beginning of 
his article on Zarin, that “the stimulus for this article is a recent 
piece by Professor Daniel Shaviro, which contains a penetrating 
critique of the various options handed down in Zarin.”432 Very 
helpfully, Professor Dodge agrees with the following items con-
cerning Zarin (this writer is in accord with many, but not all, of 
these positions433):
(1) The existence of debt-cancellation income is not dependent 
upon a “freeing of assets” theory. (2) The parameters of such 
income are determined neither by § 108 nor the § 61 regulations, 
but rather by the evolving “common law” of gross income. (3) The 
loan was a valid loan for tax purposes when made even if it was 
then legally unenforceable. (4) Commissioner v. Tufts mandates 
that the debt be treated, consistently with the foregoing, as be-
ing valid when cancelled (even if unenforceable). (5) The Third 
Circuit majority’s statement that a compromise of a cash loan 
does not give rise to debt-cancellation income is a serious blunder. 
(6) Chips are not “property” under § 108(e)(5) (the statutory 
purchase-price reduction rule). (7) A purchase-price reduction rule 
exists independently of the statute, where the purchase-money 
debt relates to consumption rather than an asset. (8) Bowers 
v. Kerbaugh-Empire Corp., which allowed debt-cancellation 
income to be excluded on the ground that such income was 
fact that Zarin was being charged with additional gross income, 
not denied the deduction of a loss. 
Id. at 239. Professor Shaviro also, while not “ground[ing] the decision” be-
cause of it, “conclude[d] that compulsive or addicted gamblers should not be 
taxed on cancellation of indebtedness income when they settle at a discount 
gambling debts that were at least possibly unenforceable when entered into.” 
Id. at 250. 
430 Id. at 258. 
431 Id.
432 Dodge, supra note 19, at 677 (footnote omitted). 
433 As to item #8, this writer agrees if the word “is” was replaced by “should.” 
See id. at 678. With respect to #7, this writer agrees that there certainly are 
valid arguments that section 108(e)(5) does not preempt a court from apply-
ing a non-statutory purchase price reduction for services but as explained 
infra does not subscribe to its application to Zarin. See id. at 677–78. He is in 
accord with the rest of Professor Dodge’s assertions. 
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less than the loss on the transaction funded by the borrowed 
money, is no longer good law.434
Professor Dodge believed that Zarin should not have income 
from the transaction, but for reasons that differ from that of the 
Third Circuit.435 His central premise was that Zarin ‘received’ 
neither property nor cash, but only (if anything) consumption, which 
appears in the tax base as $500,000, the amount spent on it.436
He considered it “plausible [but inaccurate] to say that the chips 
were purchased with ‘borrowed money’ ....”437 Professor Dodge 
concluded “that there can be no debt-cancellation income where 
consumption is purchased on credit in commerce and the debt is 
subsequently cancelled or settled.”438 Under Professor Dodge’s 
rationale, “one cannot simply assume that Zarin received $3.4 
million in money or money’s worth from the gambling transac-
tions because $3.4 million was the face amount of the liability.”439
 Professor Seto argued that the Tax Court’s conclusion 
that “the actual value of Zarin’s chips equaled their face value—
$3,435,000 [was erroneous].”440 This was, he contended, because 
New Jersey law required that the chips “first be applied against the 
gambler’s outstanding credit balance.”441 This does not seem to 
undercut that the chips face value equaled the $3.435 million debt 
obligation. For example, if Zarin were to quit when he was ahead, 
e.g., with $3.6 million worth of chips, the first $3.435 million would 
go to the house to offset his debt and the remaining $165,000 
worth of chips could be redeemed for their cash equivalent. 
 Another argument Professor Seto made that was consistent 
with one advanced by Professor Dodge and others is that “[w]hen 
purchase money debt is partially discharged, we must decide which 
price—original or adjusted—should be deemed to represent the 
value of the item for tax purposes.”442 That is, “[i]f ... the adjusted 
434 Id. at 677–78 (footnotes omitted). 
435 Id. at 682. 
436 Dodge, supra note 19, at 682. 
437 Id. at 679. 
438 Id. at 683 (footnote omitted). 
439 Id. at 679. 
440 Seto, supra note 213, at 1771. 
441 Id.
442 Id. at 1773. 
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price is the item’s deemed value, then the discharge merely brings 
the price actually paid into line with the item’s deemed value.”443
 Professor Seto’s article also provided “ways of thinking 
about what happened: a theorist’s account,”444 including examin-
ing the case through the lens of the Haig-Simons definition of 
income.445 Professor Seto furnished the foregoing assessment of 
what he believed the right answer was with respect to Zarin:
A strong practical argument can be made that unenforceabil-
ity should not determine whether discharged gambling debt is 
taxable. A strong theoretical argument can be made that los-
ing gamblers do not receive commensurate consumption value, 
even if their debts are enforceable. It may also be true that 
the Code does not treat gambling as a consumption activity. 
And any tax rule governing the discharge of gambling debts 
must work in both market and nonmarket contexts. For all of 
these reasons, I suggest that the rule of United States v. Hall
is in fact “correct”—that the discharge of gambling debts 
should be treated as nontaxable per se.446
Professor Zelenak would have decided in favor of the taxpayer, 
although he, like several other commentators found “the opinion of 
the Third Circuit majority [to be] technically indefensible ....”447
He subscribed to the view expressed by Judge Tannenwald that: 
In all the decided cases involving the cancellation of indebted-
ness, the taxpayer had, in a prior year when the indebtedness 
was created, received a nontaxable benefit clearly measurable 
in monetary terms which would remain untaxed if the subse-
quent cancellation of the indebtedness were held to be tax 
free. Such is simply not the case herein.448
Professor Zelenak, like some other scholars, rejected the notion that 
Zarin should be viewed “as a case of gambling with borrowed 
443 Id.
444 Id. at 1793 (the topic is discussed at 1793–1807). 
445 See Seto, supra note 213, at 1795–99; HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL 
INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938); ROBERT MURRAY HAIG, READINGS IN ECONOMICS 
OF TAXATION 54 (Richard A. Musgrave & Carl S. Shoup eds., 9th ed. 1959). 
446 See Seto, supra note 213, at 1808. 
447 See Zelenak, supra note 8, at 323. 
448 Id. at 322 (footnote omitted) (citing Zarin v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1084, 1101 
(1989) (Tannenwald, J., dissenting)).  
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cash ....”449 Thus, if one agrees with Professor Zelenak, Zarin
would not be construed as a loan followed by the purchase of the 
right to gamble and there would be no tax benefit when Zarin 
received the gambling credit of $3.435 million.450 Therefore, under 
the loan proceeds methodology there would be no COD income 
upon settlement.451
 Professor Barton, who would have found Zarin taxable,452
rejected the notion that the face value of the chips and loan were 
less than $3.435 million.453 She pointed out that “[t]he fact that 
Zarin spent $2.5 million of his own funds for chips of an equiva-
lent $2.5 million face value corroborates the $3.435 million face 
value of the chips and debt.”454 She disagreed with the notion 
advanced by some other scholars that “the figure at the date of 
settlement consumption is [on policy grounds] the appropriate 
measure of the debt ....”455 Professor Barton considered that “the 
otherwise unsupported assertion that the size of Zarin’s debt 
equaled its $0.5 million settlement value appears to be a result-
oriented pronouncement advanced on the basis of Zarin’s acknowl-
edged compulsive condition.”456
 Professor Barton was sympathetic to Zarin’s plight despite 
her conclusion that he should have had COD income.457 She rec-
ognized that he was “[d]riven to gamble compulsively by a psy-
chological aberration, [he] suffered dearly from loss of personal 
fortune. The toll from his compulsive gambling would have been 
grossly aggravated had the tax levy growing out of that very aberra-
tion been sustained.”458 Nevertheless, she believed it was not up to 
the courts, but Congress to address these types of circumstances.459
 Professors McMahon and Simmons also believed Zarin 
should have been taxed.460 They wrote that “Zarin was erroneously 
449 Id. at 324. 
450 Id.
451 Id.
452 See Barton, supra note 168, at 782. 
453 Id. at 763. 
454 Id. at 763. 
455 Id. at 764 (footnote omitted). 
456 Id. at 765 (footnote omitted). 
457 Id. at 781–82. 
458 Id. at 781. 
459 Id. at 782. 
460 See McMahon & Simmons, supra note 3, at 437. 
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decided and is unlikely to be generally followed.”461 They reasoned 
that “[u]nder accepted principles that gross income includes the 
objective, rather than subjective, value of items received in a 
market transaction, the effect of the Third Circuit’s opinion was 
to allow Zarin to receive $2.9 million tax-free, even though none 
of the exceptions to section 61(a)(12) or section 108 applied.”462
 Professor Schenk also thought that Zarin should have had 
COD income.463 She pointed out that, as Judge Stapleton noted 
in his dissent, “regardless of whether the loan was enforceable, 
Zarin received something of value when he undertook the obli-
gation which was not taxable.”464 She commented that “[i]f Zarin 
had borrowed the $3.5 million from his local bank before arriv-
ing at the casino and then lost it all gambling, he clearly would 
have had COD income if the bank discharged the debt.”465 The 
funds were, as described by Professor Deborah A. Geier, “received 
free of tax on the assumption that it would be repaid with after-tax 
dollars. When that assumption proves unwarranted by $2,935,000, 
the debtor’s accession to wealth is apparent.”466
 Professor Schenk also posited that  
[a]nother way to reach the same result [i.e., that Zarin should
be taxed] without delving into debt discharge theory is to tax 
Zarin because he enjoyed consumption that he did not pay for and 
was not a gift from the transferor. What Zarin purchased with 
loan proceeds was entertainment (the right to gamble).467
Assuming an objective measure of enjoyment, i.e., spending, that 
ignores the psychological state of a compulsive gambler, this too 
461 Id.
462 Id.
463 See Schenk, supra note 12, at 169. 
464 Id. (citing Zarin v. Comm’r, 916 F.2d 110, 118 (3d Cir. 1990) (Stapleton, 
J., dissenting)). Professor Joel S. Newman was also in accord that Zarin 
should have been taxed. Joel S. Newman, Five Will Get You Ten; You Haven’t 
Heard the Last About ‘Zarin’, 50 TAX NOTES 667 n.7d (1991). 
465 Schenk, supra note 12, at 169. 
466 Deborah A. Geier, Tufts and the Evolution of Debt-Discharge Theory, 1 
FLA. TAX REV. 115, 187 n.217. Her statement, however, was written under 
the assumption that the money was borrowed from a third-party creditor and 
not Resorts. See id. at 187. 
467 Schenk, supra note 12, at 169 n.99. 
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appears to be a reasonable means of further supporting the cor-
rect conclusion.468
 While this writer does not concur with some of the Zarin-
related commentary, this does not detract from his admiration 
for some very superb scholarship provoked by the case. Only a 
relatively small part was touched upon by this Article. Despite 
the conclusion reached here that Zarin should have had COD 
income, the well-reasoned counter-arguments certainly elicit at 
least some doubt. 
D. Preslar v. Commissioner 
 The post-Zarin Tenth Circuit decision Preslar v. Commis-
sioner merits discussion. There the court found the contested 
liability doctrine inapplicable in a case with a liquidated debt 
obligation.469 In Preslar, the husband and wife taxpayers pur-
chased a 2,500 acre ranch in New Mexico.470 The consideration 
was $1 million, which was financed with a promissory note by 
Moncor Bank.471 The taxpayers’ plan was to subdivide the ranch 
into cabin and vacation homes for hunters and others seeking 
outdoor recreation.472 Moncor Bank allowed the taxpayers to 
repay the indebtedness “by assigning the installment sales con-
tracts of purchasers of cabin lots to [it] at a discount.”473 Subse-
quently, “Moncor Bank was declared insolvent and the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was appointed as receiv-
er.”474 The FDIC “refused to accept further assignments of sale 
contracts as repayment and ordered the Preslars to suspend 
sales of cabin lots.”475 While the taxpayers stopped its sales, it 
also ceased making further payments to the FDIC.476 They also 
“filed an action against the FDIC for breach of contract ... seeking 
468 Professor Dodge asserted that “the measure of consumption under the 
income tax law is what was spent, not the value of what was acquired ... psychic 
goods are not the measure of the tax base ....” Dodge, supra note 19, at 681 
(footnotes omitted). 






475 Id. at 1325–26. 
476 Id. at 1326. 
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an order requiring the FDIC to accept assignment of sales con-
tracts as loan repayment.”477 The litigation was eventually set-
tled for payment of $350,000 (which the taxpayers borrowed 
from another bank).478 The result, after taking prior payments 
into consideration, was that slightly less than $450,000 was no 
longer owed by the taxpayers to FDIC from the initial loan.479
After an audit, the Service assessed a deficiency on grounds that 
the Preslars had discharge of indebtedness income of the ap-
proximate $450,000, which the FDIC agreed not to collect.480
 The taxpayers argued in Tax Court that “their settlement 
with the FDIC [was] a purchase price adjustment under § 108(e)(5) 
and/or common law.”481 The Service asserted “that the Preslars 
could not invoke § 108(e)(5) because that provision applies only 
to situations where the seller of property agrees to reduce the 
amount of the purchaser’s debt flowing from the property sale.”482
Furthermore, “[t]he party responsible for reducing the Preslars’ 
debt was not the seller but was the FDIC (as receiver for Moncor 
Bank) thereby rendering § 108(e)(5) inapplicable.”483
 The Tax Court ignored the question of the applicability of 
section 108(e)(5) and “sua sponte invoked the contested liability 
doctrine and held the Preslars’ unusual payment arrangement 
with Moncor Bank caused their liability for the full $1 million 
loan to be brought into question.”484 The Tax Court “determined 
the true amount of the Preslars’ indebtedness was not firmly 
established until they settled with the FDIC; thus, no discharge-
of-indebtedness income could have accrued to the Preslars as a 
result of the settlement.”485
 The Tenth Circuit reversed the Tax Court and rejected 
the appropriateness of applying the contested liability doctrine 
to the case at bar.486 The Tenth Circuit examined both N. Sobel 










486 Id. at 1328. 
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the doctrine germane.487 The Tenth Circuit in Preslar was very 
critical of the Third Circuit’s analysis in Zarin, commenting: 
The problem with the Third Circuit’s holding [in Zarin] is it 
treats liquidated and unliquidated debts alike. The whole theory 
behind requiring that the amount of a debt be disputed before 
the contested liability exception can be triggered is that only in 
the context of disputed debts is the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) unaware of the exact consideration initially exchanged 
in a transaction. ... The mere fact that a taxpayer challenges 
the enforceability of a debt in good faith does not necessarily 
mean he or she is shielded from discharge-of-indebtedness in-
come upon resolution of the dispute. To implicate the contested 
liability doctrine, the original amount of the debt must be 
unliquidated. A total denial of liability is not a dispute touch-
ing upon the amount of the underlying debt. ... [Quoting a 
commentator] “Enforceability of the debt ... should not affect 
the tax treatment of the transaction. If the parties initially 
treated the transaction as a loan when the loan proceeds were 
received, thereby not declaring the receipt as income, then the 
transaction should be treated consistently when the loan is 
discharged and income should be declared in the amount of 
the discharge.”488
 Judge Ebel’s Preslar dissent pointed out that in N. Sobel,
When the note became due the corporation refused to pay, 
disputing not the amount of the note but rather the validity of 
the note itself “on the ground that the bank made the loan in 
violation of law and failed to carry out promises to guarantee 
the [corporation] against loss.”489
He further observed that “[t]he Board of Tax Appeals found no 
discharge of indebtedness income, even though the corporation 
did not dispute the amount of the debt and even though the original 
amount was liquidated (at $21,700).”490 The dissent concluded 
its argument that N. Sobel was not supportive of the majority’s 
position with the following: 
487 Id.
488 Id. at 1328–29. The last two sentences quoted by the Third Circuit is 
from Giangiordano, supra note 86, at 1202 n.88. 
489 Preslar, 167 F.3d at 1333–34 (Ebel, J., dissenting). 
490 Id. at 1334 (citation omitted). 
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[T]he majority’s view that the contested liability doctrine ap-
plies only when the original amount of a debt is disputed and 
unliquidated is mistakenly narrow. This view ignores the fact 
that the original amount of a debt is necessarily disputed and 
may be unliquidated under a good faith dispute over liability 
“that can be traced to the circumstances in existence at the 
time of the debt’s creation.”491
 The dissent’s position regarding N. Sobel was, at least, 
somewhat doubtful. The Tenth Circuit majority indicated N.
Sobel applied the contested liability doctrine in a case where both 
the liability and amount were in question.492 The court cited the 
following language from the Board of Tax Appeals decision: “There 
is question whether the taxpayer bought property in 1929 and 
question as to its liability and the amount thereof.”493
 Professor Musselman was among the scholars that were 
critical of the utilization of the contested liability doctrine to avoid 
COD income.494 He wrote that “Preslar provides a good example 
of the confusion produced by the contested liability doctrine, and 
why that doctrine, along with the freeing of assets theory, 
should be fully and finally discarded.”495 Professor Musselman 
argued that, 
The contested liability doctrine is a necessary corollary to the 
freeing of assets theory, to allow for a determination of the ac-
tual amount of the taxpayer’s liability in appropriate cases, so 
that the amount of discharge (and thus the amount of income 
from such discharge) can be determined. It is only because of 
the unnecessary rigidity of the freeing of assets theory that 
the contested liability doctrine has come into existence.496
Preslar was instructive that Tufts negates lack of enforce-
ability as opening the door to the contested liability doctrine.497
The Tenth Circuit stated that the conclusion it reached that 
“[t]he mere fact that a taxpayer challenges the enforceability of 
491 Id. (citations omitted). 
492 Id. at 1328. 
493 Id. at 1328 (citing N. Sobel, Inc. v. Comm’r, 40 B.T.A. 1263, 1265 (1939)). 
494 See Musselman, supra note 6, at 651. 
495 Id.
496 Id. at 646–47 (footnotes omitted). 
497 Preslar, 167 F.3d at 1329. 
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a debt in good faith does not necessarily mean he or she is 
shielded from discharge-of-indebtedness income upon resolution 
of the dispute ... is underscored by the Supreme Court’s holding 
in Tufts ....”498 The Tenth Circuit explained that in Tufts:
The Court reasoned that because the indebtedness is treated as 
a true debt when it is incurred, it must be treated as a true debt 
when it is discharged, with all the attendant tax consequences. 
It seems evident from this ruling that if the distinction be-
tween the recourse and nonrecourse nature of a loan has no 
bearing on calculation of gross income, the enforceability of a 
debt should be of equally minimal importance.499
 The Preslar dissent challenged the reliance on Tufts.500
Judge Ebel argued that “[n]onrecourse loans and unenforceable 
debts are not functional equivalent. Nonrecourse loans are en-
forceable, unenforceable debts are not. A party may sue to collect on 
a nonrecourse loan, but cannot sue to collect on an unenforceable 
debt.”501 The dissent observed that  
[w]hile a taxpayer has no personal liability upon default of a 
nonrecourse loan, the taxpayer nonetheless is always liable 
for the loan. That liability merely is capped by the value of the 
underlying security interest .... Given an unenforceable debt, 
the taxpayer has no liability. This distinction can make all 
the difference for tax purposes.502
Lee Sheppard, writing prior to Preslar, had a contrary opinion to 
that of the dissent as to the effect of Tufts,503 stating that “[i]f 
the difference between recourse and nonrecourse does not mat-
ter for tax purposes, neither should legal enforceability.”504 Her 
views were shared by other commentators.505
498 Id. at 1328–29. 
499 Id. at 1329. 
500 Id. at 1336 (Ebel, J., dissenting). 
501 Id.
502 Id. at 1336–37. 
503 Lee A. Sheppard, A Gambling Exception to Cancellation of Indebtedness 
Income?, 49 TAX NOTES 1516, 1517 (1990). 
504 Id.
505 See, e.g., Pomeroy, supra note 74, at 1690–91. 
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 Professor Chad J. Pomeroy506 made a forceful argument 
that the Tenth Circuit legal analysis of Tufts applicability was 
correct.507 He asserted that the Tenth Circuit was justified in 
holding that if the debt was “liquidated (enforceable or not), the 
Preslars would have to include any debt-discharge amount in 
gross income.”508 He viewed Tufts as a game-changer in the reso-
lution of whether a taxpayer has COD income.509 His contention 
was that the Supreme Court in Tufts abandoned the freeing of 
assets approach and adopted symmetry.510 As discussed above, the 
Tax Court in Zarin cited Tufts and its concern with symmetry as 
part of its reasoning in determining that lack of enforceability 
should not prevent COD income from occurring.511 Professor 
Pomeroy wrote that, in Tufts,
[t]he Supreme Court ... ignor[ed] whether the discharge freed the 
taxpayer’s assets from obligations (or even the question of 
whether the taxpayer had economic incentive to honor the ob-
ligation) and instead focus[ed] on whether an untaxed discharge 
transaction would mean that “the mortgagor effectively will have 
received untaxed income at the time the loan was extended.”512
 He asserted that Tufts “was the birth of symmetry because 
the Court cared only about the debt money that was received on 
the front end of the transaction; that is, the amount that needs to 
be taxed on the back end of the transaction (if, of course, it is dis-
charged).”513 Symmetry is effectively another term for the loan 
proceeds methodology. Professor Pomeroy stated that although 
506 While currently a full professor at St. Mary’s University School of Law 
he was a law student, albeit summa cum laude, when his Preslar comment
was published. Chad J. Pomeroy, ST. MARY’S SCH. OF L., https://law.stmarytx 
.edu/academics/faculty/chad-pomeroy/ [https://perma.cc/MLA2-W732]. 
507 See, e.g., Pomeroy, supra note 74, at 1690–91. 
508 See id. at 1699. However, it is important to note that Professor Pomeroy 
believed that the Preslars’ debt was not liquidated. Id.
509 See id. at 1689. 
510 See id. at 1689; see also Schenk, supra note 12, at 148 (referring to 
United States v. Centennial Bank, the case where Professor Schenk observed 
“that the Court essentially cites both the loan proceeds and the freeing-of-
assets theories.”). But see United States v. Centennial Bank, 499 U.S. 573, 
583 (1991) (decided after Tufts). 
511 See Pomeroy, supra note 74, at 1689. 
512 Id. (footnotes omitted) (citing Comm’r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 310 (1983)).
513 Id.
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“the factual context of Tufts may have differed from the normal 
debt-discharge income scenario, the Court’s reasoning was broad 
enough to encompass all debt-discharge income.”514 Furthermore, 
“[w]hen one gets rid of debt, the Court simply asks whether or 
not the taxpayer is receiving an unwarranted accession to wealth 
because the IRS did not tax the amount in the beginning since it 
thought at the time that the taxpayer was obligated to repay the 
debt.”515 He noted that if one applies this methodology, the Ser-
vice should “not care if the debt is enforceable because that does 
not affect the amount initially received and excluded.”516
 Prior to the decision in Preslar, Professor Barton also em-
phasized the importance of Tufts, as to how Zarin should have 
been analyzed by the Third Circuit.517 She stated that: 
If Zarin in fact derived an unpaid-for benefit in settling the 
$3.5 million loan for a payment of $0.5 million, the Tufts doc-
trine requires that he report income equal to the value of the 
benefit, whether or not the loan was enforceable or incurred for 
the purpose of gambling. It was this issue of benefit, not enforcea-
bility, that deserved the Third Circuit’s attention in Zarin.518
 One other item worth mentioning in Preslar, with relevance 
to Zarin, was the discussion of the taxpayers’ argument that:  
[T]he common law purchase price reduction doctrine may be 
invoked in cases where ... § 108(e)(5) is inapplicable. The Com-
missioner responds that § 108(e)(5) has displaced the common 
law on this issue and, in any event, a debt reduction by a third-
party lender was not considered a purchase price adjustment 
under common law.519
The Tenth Circuit suggested that section 108(e)(5) may be 
interpreted as preempting the common law with respect to purchase 
money debt disputes, observing that “[i]f, as the Preslars argue, the 
common law rule remains viable and permits taxpayers involved in 
third-party transactions to treat their debt reductions as pur-
chase price adjustments rather than additions to their gross 
514 Id. at 1690 (footnote omitted). 
515 Id.
516 Id. at 1692. 
517 See Barton, supra note 168, at 757. 
518 Id. 
519 Preslar v. Comm’r, 167 F.3d 1323, 1332 (10th Cir. 1999). 
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income, § 108(e)(5) would be rendered meaningless.”520 However, 
many scholars believe there remains a common law purchase price 
exclusion outside of section 108(e)(5). Professors McMahon and 
Simmons indicated that the Tenth Circuit comment on preemption 
was “erroneous.”521 Professor Dodge noted that “[a] purchase-price 
reduction rule exists independently of the statute, where the 
purchase-money debt relates to consumption rather than an 
asset.”522 Professor Gunn expressed sentiments similar to that of 
Professor Dodge.523
E. Analysis
 While there is a temptation to simply state, as Professor 
Shaviro did that “Zarin is a case without a right answer,”524 this 
Article proffers a resolution, but with the recognition that there 
are reasonable contrary positions.525 Furthermore, as discussed 
in the final hypothetical below, this writer would not extend 
Zarin to other service providers who were not also functioning 
as de facto lenders.526
 This writer is of the opinion that the Tax Court and Judge 
Stapleton were correct in concluding that Zarin should have had 
COD income and that the loan proceeds approach is the appro-
priate methodology for making this determination.527 While Pro-
fessor Pomeroy may or may not be right that the Supreme Court 
in Tufts abandoned the freeing of assets approach,528 and Pro-
fessor Schenk was unconvinced,529 the utilization of the loan 
proceeds theory was certainly consistent with Tufts’s requirement 
520 Id.
521 McMahon & Simmons, supra note 3, at 436. 
522 Dodge, supra note 19, at 678. 
523 See Gunn, supra note 422, at 895. 
524 Shaviro, supra note 11, at 250. 
525 See discussion infra Section II.E. 
526 See id.
527 See id.; see also Zarin v. Comm’r, 916 F.2d 110, 118 n.3 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(Stapleton, J., dissenting). 
528 See Pomeroy, supra note 74, at 1689. 
529 See Schenk, supra note 12, at 148. But see id. at 151 (stating that “[l]eg-
islative history indicates that when Congress revamped the insolvency rules as 
part of the Bankruptcy Act of 1980, it abandoned the freeing-of-assets theory 
in favor of the loan proceeds approach”). 
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for symmetry.530 This methodology rests on the proposition, ar-
ticulated by Professors Bittker and Thompson, that “[d]ebtors who 
ultimately pay back less than they received enjoy a financial benefit 
whether the funds are invested successfully, lost in a business 
venture, spent for food and clothing, or given to a charity.”531 One 
should add “lost in gambling” to that list. Moreover, as discussed 
infra, none of the possible exceptions should change the result that 
Zarin should have had taxable income from the settlement.532
 Contrary to Judge Tannenwald’s dissenting Tax Court opin-
ion in Zarin,533 and the view of some scholars, including Professor 
Zelenak,534 the debt obligation and the amount received was 
measurable, $3.435 million, at the time of the loans’ creation.535
Prior to placing his first bet, Zarin could have, if he so desired, 
used the gambling credit he received to extinguish his debt to 
Resorts, dollar for dollar.536 Similar treatment would have occurred 
if he settled when he was ahead or even behind, but not wiped 
out. If he had, for example, decided to quit when he was down, 
for example $435,000, he could have extinguished $3 million of 
debt with his remaining credit. 
 Zarin was not subject to tax when he received the chips 
because both parties had an understanding it would be repaid.537
This tax benefit he received at the time of the loans results in COD 
income, unless an exception applied, and none should. As de-
scribed by Professors Bittker and Thompson, the “borrowed funds 
are excluded from gross income when received because of the as-
sumption that they will be repaid in full and that a tax adjustment 
is required when this assumption proves erroneous.”538 This conclu-
sion should not be undermined simply because Zarin obtained 
for his indebtedness gambling credit instead of cash. Even though 
he was out $500,000, he had a $2.935 million accession to wealth 
530 See Geier, supra note 466, at 145. 
531 Bittker & Thompson, supra note 49, at 1165. 
532 See discussion infra Section II.E. 
533 See Zarin v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1084, 1101 (1989) (Tannenwald, J., dis-
senting).
534 See Zelenak, supra note 8, at 323. 
535 See, e.g., Zorn, supra note 418, at 33 & n.182; see also Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1088. 
536 See Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1087–88. 
537 See supra notes 98–105 and accompanying text. 
538 Bittker & Thompson, supra note 49, at 1165 (footnote omitted). 
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under the tax laws.539 The fact that someone unfamiliar with 
federal taxation would likely find this result odd should not 
cause the law to be ignored. 
 As a hypothetical, assume a later day Zarin in 2020, were 
to borrow $3.435 million from a bank he intended to fund his 
gambling, and he placed real estate as collateral for the loan. 
Further suppose the following events occurred. The value of the 
real estate diminished substantially to $500,000. Zarin put the 
money he received from the bank under his mattress. His bed-
room caught fire, destroying the cash before he set foot in the 
casino. He lacks insurance for his loss. He settled with the bank 
for the real estate now worth $500,000. Because of section 
165(h)(5)’s limitation on casualty losses from 2018 to 2025, he 
does not obtain a tax deduction for his loss.540 While perhaps our 
hypothetical Zarin is as sympathetic as the real one, it should be 
fairly clear that he has COD income of $2.935 million.541
 There is an argument that the foregoing analysis misapplies 
the correct interpretation of the loan proceeds methodology. The 
reasoning essentially is that Zarin did not actually obtain $3.435 
million in U.S. dollars from Resorts, and since “the debtor did not 
originally receive cash or other loan proceeds in exchange for in-
curring the debt, its cancellation should not be taxable.”542 That is, 
according to Professor Zelenak, “Zarin should be understood as a 
case of gambling with borrowed cash ....”543 It should be seen instead 
“as nothing more than a reduction of the cost of the gambling 
experience.”544 While this analysis is not entirely unreasonable, this 
way of thinking arguably opens up a Pandora’s box as to where 
the line is drawn.545 For example, what if instead, Resorts owned 
539 Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1085; supra note 409 and accompanying text. 
540 See I.R.C. § 165(h)(5). 
541 The fact he did not “consume” the loan proceeds should not change this 
result; nor should the fact, like gambling losses, he received no tax benefit for 
his loss. 
542 Beck, supra note 99, at 166. 
543 Zelenak, supra note 8, at 324. Zelenak goes on to explain that he be-
lieves Zarin would be better characterized as “merely a case of gambling without 
an escrow,” meaning no COD income arises. Id.
544 Kahn & Kahn, supra note 3, at 206. 
545 See discussion infra Section II.E. As will be discussed at the end of this 
section, this writer’s distinction of Zarin from some other service providers 
2021] ZARIN V. COMMISSIONER REVISITED 609 
a bank that lent him the money to buy the chips utilized in the 
casino? Assuming one would agree he would have COD income in 
that scenario, should the answer in Zarin be different “on the 
happenstance that the creditor wore two hats: lender as well as 
vendor of the services purchased with the credit”?546
 If one, erroneously in the opinion of this writer, were to 
utilize the historic whole transaction approach, encompassing 
the Kerbaugh-Empire methodology, instead of the loan proceeds 
approach, then Zarin’s gambling losses would have precluded 
his being taxed because these losses would nullify an increase in 
net worth.547 This methodology is incorrect and should not be 
followed. Professor Dodge was of the view that, “Bowers v. Ker-
baugh-Empire Corp., which allowed debt-cancellation income to 
be excluded on the ground that such income was less than the 
loss on the transaction funded by the borrowed money, is no 
longer good law.”548 Regardless of whether Professor Dodge was 
correct, it should “no longer [be considered] good law.”549 The 
transactional approach espoused by Professors Kahn and Kahn 
would similarly, but for different reasons, find no COD income; 
it would be treated “as nothing more than a reduction of the cost 
of the gambling experience.”550
 What about the application of the freeing of assets meth-
odology to Zarin? To employ this approach would be mistaken, 
for reasons articulated by Professors Bittker and Thompson: 
“Such reasoning misses the point. Income results from the dis-
charge of indebtedness because the taxpayer received (and ex-
cluded from income) funds that he is no longer required to pay 
back, not because assets are freed of offsetting liabilities on the 
balance sheet.”551 Commentators disagree as to the result if it 
had been applied to the Zarin fact-pattern.552 One view is that 
COD income would occur, because “any cancellation leads to an 
who reduce or eliminate fees to customers perhaps opens up another Pandora’s 
box on where the line is drawn. 
546 Geier, supra note 466, at 188 n.217. 
547 See discussion supra Part I. 
548 Dodge, supra note 19, at 678 (footnotes omitted). 
549 Id.
550 Kahn & Kahn, supra note 3, at 206. 
551 Bittker & Thompson, supra note 49, at 1165. 
552 Compare Newman, supra note 464, at 667 n.7a, with Pomeroy, supra 
note 74, at 1693–94. 
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increase in net worth, whether the loan proceeds were used for 
consumption [as in Zarin] or investment.”553
 Professor Pomeroy, in contrast, argued the freeing of assets 
theory was in fact implicitly utilized by the Third Circuit in Zarin in 
determining the absence of COD income.554 He asserted that “[t]he 
court [in effect implicitly utilized the freeing of assets methodology 
when it] allowed the after-the-fact debt valuation because it focused 
on the concept of asset worth—it wanted to know how much, in 
Zarin’s current assets, the debt really represented at the time of 
purchase.”555 He contended that the “Third Circuit [in Zarin]
searched for an answer to that question: how much was the origi-
nal debt really worth? Since acknowledging that the more one has 
lost the more one has consumed seems odd and counterintuitive; the 
court refused to stop at the standard cost-based approach.”556 It 
essentially “allowed the parties to assign a value after they had 
concluded that the debt was legally unenforceable.”557 He believed 
that the Third Circuit “implicitly adopted a freed assets justifica-
tion but did not want to explicitly say so, in light of the fact that 
Tufts had probably overruled that justification.”558
 The right conclusion that the Third Circuit should have 
reached was that Zarin had COD income not altered by any of the 
following: 1) the fact the debt was found to be unenforceable by the 
Tax Court; 2) the contested liability doctrine; 3) section 108(d)(1); 4) 
section 108(e)(5); or 5) a common law version of the purchase-
money debt reduction for services.559 The fact that the Tax Court 
found the debt to be legally unenforceable (under circumstances 
553 Newman, supra note 464, at 667 n.7a. 
554 See Pomeroy, supra note 74, at 1693–94. 
555 Id.
556 Id. at 1694. 
557 Id.
558 Id. at 1695 (footnote omitted). Professor Pomeroy noted that the freed assets 
approach is more sensitive to what the initial consumption 
was really worth (i.e., a person would not encumber his assets 
unless he had some set value in mind), the court is more will-
ing to allow parties to go back and re-decide how much things 
were worth if the transaction seems odd to the court. Also, the 
fact that Zarin only cited freed assets cases suggests that this 
is indeed the rationale the court was implicitly adopting. 
Id. at 1695 n.109. 
559 See discussion supra Sections II.A, II.B. 
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where the Service bore the burden of proof) should not have pre-
vented COD income from occurring upon the debt’s settlement.560
The Tax Court correctly determined that “[t]he enforceability of 
petitioner’s debts under New Jersey law did not affect either the 
timing or amount and thus is not determinative for federal in-
come tax purposes.”561
 Instead of focusing on whether the debt was enforceable, 
as the Third Circuit did, it should have concentrated upon what 
the parties intended at the time the debtor-creditor relationship 
commenced. The parties clearly desired to establish loans by 
Resorts to Zarin of $3.435 million to engage in gambling at its 
casino.562 Even many commentators who believed the outcome of 
the Third Circuit decision was correct, agreed that the Third 
Circuit’s concentration on the loans’ unenforceability was an 
improper red herring.563 Professor Dodge, citing James v. United 
States, concluded that “[t]he [Resorts’] loan was a valid loan for 
tax purposes when made even if it was then legally unenforcea-
ble.”564 Professor Shaviro wrote that: 
[l]egal enforceability should not be deemed a prerequisite to 
includability in gross income. It shifts the focus from econom-
ic substance, or whether the parties expect repayment, to a 
legal technicality that provides only one possible ground for 
the expectation. An expectation of repayment can also arise 
from personal trust founded on a mutual sense of moral obli-
gation, or from the debtor’s self-interest if she has a business 
reputation to protect or there is an ongoing, mutually profita-
ble course of dealing between the parties.565
 As noted, the Third Circuit’s focus on enforceability was 
properly criticized by the Tenth Circuit in Preslar, where the court 
stated that the
560 Pomeroy, supra note 74, at 1694. 
561 Zarin v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1084, 1094 (1989). 
562 See id. at 1105. 
563 See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 19. 
564 Dodge, supra note 19, at 678. Professor Dodge wrote that James “is 
squarely on point for this proposition. There, the Court stated the test in terms 
of a ‘consensual recognition ... of an obligation to repay.’” Id. at 678 n.4 (citing 
James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 219 (1961). 
565 See Shaviro, supra note 11, at 254 n.122. 
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[e]nforceability of the debt ... should not affect the tax treatment 
of the transaction. If the parties initially treated the transaction 
as a loan when the loan proceeds were received, thereby not 
declaring the receipt as income, then the transaction should 
be treated consistently when the loan is discharged and in-
come should be declared in the amount of the discharge.566
As was recognized in Preslar, this conclusion is clearly supported 
by the Court’s decision in Tufts.567
 The Third Circuit in Zarin applied the contested liability 
doctrine because it stated that “when a debt is unenforceable, it 
follows that the amount of the debt, and not just the liability 
thereon, is in dispute.”568 This was simply wrong as Preslar indi-
cated.569 There, the Tenth Circuit stated, “[t]o implicate the con-
tested liability doctrine, the original amount of the debt must be 
unliquidated. A total denial of liability is not a dispute touching 
upon the amount of the underlying debt.”570 The debt in Zarin
was liquidated.571 There was no disagreement that the amount 
of the loans was originally set at $3.435 million.572 The Tax 
Court’s assessment of the invalidity of the contested liability 
doctrine to Zarin was, in contrast to the Third Circuit, spot on. 
The Tax Court opinion stated: 
There is no dispute about the amount petitioner received. The 
parties dispute only its legal enforceability, i.e., whether peti-
tioner could be legally compelled to pay Resorts the fixed amount 
he had borrowed. A genuine dispute does not exist merely be-
cause petitioner required Resorts to sue him before making 
payment of any amount on the debt.573
The Third Circuit’s rationale for applying the contested lia-
bility doctrine would expand it considerably beyond its purpose 
to cover situations wherein “the debtor disputes liability for the 
566 Preslar v. Comm’r, 167 F.3d 1323, 1329 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Gian-
giordano, supra note 86, at 1202 n.88). 
567 Comm’r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 312 (1983). 
568 Zarin v. Comm’r, 916 F.2d 110, 116 (3d Cir. 1990). 
569 Preslar, 167 F.3d at 1328 (footnote omitted). 
570 Id.
571 Zarin v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1084, 1094 (1989). 
572 Id. at 1088. 
573 Id. at 1095–96. 
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amount claimed by the alleged creditor, because such a debt is 
neither ‘absolute and not contingent’ nor for ‘a fixed amount.’”574
As noted by one commentator, if the Third Circuit’s reasoning to 
treat all unenforceable debts as subject to the contested liability 
doctrine, then “income from the discharge of indebtedness will 
never result when the underlying debt is unenforceable.”575 Lim-
iting the contested liability doctrine to liquidated debt obliga-
tions is sound tax policy. It’s a non-statutory exception to COD 
income where Congress has created specific exclusions.576 Finally, 
the consequence of the Third Circuit’s position, which is that 
there is no COD income on the forgiveness of unenforceable 
debts, is that the proceeds that are received initially without any 
offsetting legal obligation to pay back should result in income in 
the initial year under section 61.577
 Section 108(d)(1) also does not change the result that Zarin 
should have had taxable income. The Third Circuit was right 
about section 108(d)(1) not applying, but for the wrong reason. 
As discussed above, section 108(d)(1) defines “indebtedness of 
the taxpayer” to mean “[f]or purposes of this section ... (A) for 
which the taxpayer is liable, or (B) subject to which the taxpayer 
holds property.”578 The Third Circuit found that neither (A) nor 
(B) was satisfied.579 There should be little controversy that “Zarin 
did not hold property” when the debt was discharged because 
even if it were incorrectly treated to be property for purposes of 
this section,580 the chips were gone by the time the dispute was 
settled.581 The Third Circuit’s finding that “[b]ecause the debt 
Zarin owed to Resorts was unenforceable as a matter of New 
Jersey state law, it is clearly not a debt ‘for which the taxpayer 
is liable,’”582 was, however, in error. Lack of enforceability does 
not abrogate a taxpayer’s liability. As discussed, this point should 
be academic. This is because, as Judge Stapleton stated in a 
574 Bittker & Thompson, supra note 49, at 1169 (footnote omitted). 
575 Giangiordano, supra note 86, at 1200. 
576 I.R.C. § 108(a)(1). 
577 See Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1088. 
578 I.R.C. § 108(d)(1) (emphasis added). 
579 Zarin v. Comm’r, 916 F.2d 110, 113–14 (3d Cir. 1990). 
580 The Third Circuit correctly found it not to be “property” for this purpose. 
See id. at 114. 
581 Id.
582 Id. at 113. 
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footnote, “[s]ection 108(d) expressly defines that term solely for 
the purposes of § 108 and not for the purposes of § 61(a)(12).”583
As discussed above, some, but not all the commentators found, 
as this writer does, this to be a compelling argument.584
 Both the Tax Court and the Third Circuit determined section 
108(e)(5) to be inapposite to Zarin, albeit for different reasons.585
The statutory provision should certainly have been inapplicable, 
because both the gambling chips were not as the Tax Court indi-
cated the “normal commercial property”586 intended to be cov-
ered by the provision and also that the section cannot operate in 
circumstances like Zarin where the taxpayer does not own the 
property at time of the settlement.587 One requirement for satis-
fying the “purchase-money debt reduction for solvent debtors,” 
i.e., section 108(e)(5), which treats such transactions as price 
reductions rather than COD income, is that “the debt of a pur-
chaser of property to the seller of such property ... arose out of 
the purchase of such property ....”588 The Tax Court determined 
that Zarin incurred the indebtedness for “[t]he ‘opportunity to 
gamble,’” and that he did not buy “property” as that term is used 
in section 108(e)(5).589 Professor Seto pointed out that a major 
flaw in Judge Ruwe’s Tax Court dissent was that he “treated the 
‘purchase’ of the chips as an event having independent tax signif-
icance.”590 As was recognized by both the Tax Court and the Third 
Circuit, “the chips [were] nothing more than ‘the opportunity to 
gamble ...[;]’ [they] are merely an accounting mechanism to evi-
dence debt.”591 In this regard, Professor Shaviro wrote: 
Within the casino, the chips were a form of cash. They evidenced 
money that had been paid in or credit that had been granted, 
and they represented specific dollar values that could not 
fluctuate. The price of a chip, like the price of a five dollar bill 
and unlike the price of a car, was not negotiable. Thus, the dispute 
583 Id. at 118 n.3 (Stapleton, J., dissenting). 
584 Supra Section II.B. 
585 Supra Section II.C. 
586 Zarin v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1084, 1099 (1989). 
587 Id. at 1099–100.
588 I.R.C. § 108(e)(5). 
589 Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1099. 
590 See Seto, supra note 213, at 1789. 
591 Zarin v. Comm’r, 916 F.2d 110, 113 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing Zarin, 92 T.C. 
at 1099). 
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between Zarin and Resorts could not possibly have been a pur-
chase price adjustment ....592
Furthermore, as Judge Stapleton noted in his Third Cir-
cuit dissenting opinion, section 108(e)(5) “necessarily applies 
only to a situation in which the debtor still holds the property 
acquired in the purchase money transaction.”593 As was explained 
by Professor Seto, section 108(e)(5) simply does not work in situ-
ations like Zarin where assuming arguendo chips constituted 
“normal commercial property;”594 he didn’t hold them at the time 
of settlement and thus there was no basis in property that could 
be adjusted.595 He explained why the debtor’s holding the prop-
erty at time of settlement is critical for the statute to work 
properly.596 He indicated that the  
deferral mechanism [in section 108(e)(5) or its no-statutory 
counterpart] cannot operate unless the taxpayer still owns the 
property. If the taxpayer has already disposed of the property 
and has accounted for that disposition using the original 
higher basis, application of either purchase price adjustment 
exception will mismeasure the taxpayer’s income ....597
592 See Shaviro, supra note 11, at 248. Professor Shaviro, however, recog-
nized that 
[o]ne could draw the § 108(e)(5) line either way .... [but i]f one 
wants to decide the case in Zarin’s favor, however, one may 
prefer to rely on the cancellation of indebtedness issue, because 
there the focus is directly on expected cost, rather than on the 
technical issue of what ‘property’ means for § 108(e)(5) purposes. 
Id. at 249 (footnote omitted). 
593 Zarin, 916 F.2d at 118 n.3 (Stapleton, J., dissenting). 
594 Id.
595 See Seto, supra note 213, at 1789. 
596 Id.
597 Id. Professor Seto reasoned that: 
In Zarin’s case, for example, Ruwe would apparently have allowed 
Zarin the $3.435 million in 1980 gambling losses—subject, of 
course, to the limitations of § 165(d)—because at the time Zarin 
lost the chips they had a basis equal to their original purchase 
price. Applying the statutory purchase price adjustment exception 
to exclude any debt discharge income, he would therefore ul-
timately have credited Zarin with $3.435 million of net losses 
even though Zarin was in fact out of pocket only $500,000. In 
other words, Ruwe would have mismeasured Zarin’s income. 
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 The Third Circuit did not discuss section 108(e)(5) per se, 
but evidently found section 108 in its entirety inapplicable be-
cause it determined that there “was no indebtedness of the tax-
payer” within the meaning of section 108(d)(1).598 As noted 
above, the conclusion vis-a-vis section 108(d)(1) was in error.599
In sum, the right decision with respect to section 108(e)(5) was 
reached, but for the wrong reason. 
 While the Tenth Circuit, in Preslar, suggested that the en-
actment of section 108(e)(5) preempted a non-statutory purchase-
money debt reduction,600 absent clear language that Congress 
intended to displace this common law approach, the arguments 
of many commentators, including Professors Dodge and Gunn 
are persuasive that a court could have employed this approach 
for services in Zarin.601 Professor Dodge wrote that “[a] pur-
chase-price reduction rule exists independently of the statute, 
Id. at 1789–90. Another commentator, Douglas E. Kulper, also explained why 
section 108(e)(5) relief should not apply when the taxpayer is devoid of the 
property at settlement. See Kulper, supra note 345, at 642. He wrote that: 
[P]urchase-money debt reduction occurs when a purchaser of 
property agrees to incur a debt to the seller, but the seller 
subsequently reduces the debt because the value of the prop-
erty is less than the agreed consideration. Even assuming that 
the property requirement of section 108(e)(5) was met, a purchase 
price adjustment could not occur under the facts in Zarin. The
purchase-money debt reduction involves three steps. First, 
the chips purchased are assigned a tax basis equivalent to the 
loan. In Zarin’s case, this would be $3,450,000 this should be 
$3,435,000. Second, the basis in the chips is reduced by the 
amount of purchase price adjustment, in this case $2,935,000. 
This would occur at settlement. Third, the buyer recognizes 
income from the purchase price adjustment when the proper-
ty is sold or transferred. At that time, the amount received 
above the basis in the property becomes recognized income. In 
Zarin’s case, however, the basis in the property was zero at 
the time of the settlement. He extinguished the basis by using 
the chips for his gambling enjoyment. Because Zarin’s basis in 
the chips at the time of settlement was zero and Zarin no longer 
retained the power of transferability of the chips, a purchase 
price adjustment could not occur. 
Id. at 639–40. 
598 See Zarin, 916 F.2d at 113. 
599 See supra Section II.E. 
600 Preslar v. Comm’r, 167 F.3d 1323, 1332–33 (10th Cir. 1999). 
601 See Gunn, supra note 422, at 895; Dodge, supra note 19, at 678. 
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where the purchase-money debt relates to consumption rather 
than an asset.”602 If this writer correctly understood Professor 
Dodge, it was his opinion that the reasoning of the court should 
have been that the cost of the gambling services ought to have 
been adjusted downward to the $500,000 payment, since “there 
can be no debt-cancellation income where the consumption is 
purchased on credit in commerce and the debt is subsequently 
cancelled or settled.”603
 Would this have been an appropriate analysis and out-
come for Zarin? Professor Schenk’s opinion was that it would not 
have been suitable. She stated: 
Whether the chips were property under § 108(e)(5) is a red 
herring. The real issue is whether the exception should apply 
when the debtor has received and used or consumed property 
worth the face amount of the debt when received .... [A] pur-
chase price adjustment is inappropriate where it is the credit 
worthiness of the borrower that has changed and the borrower 
has fully enjoyed the entertainment or services. Other than 
the majority opinion in the Third Circuit, no one argued that 
Zarin did not enjoy $3.5 million of gambling. Certainly Re-
sorts did not claim that one could pay less than $3.5 million. 
If I turned up at Resorts tomorrow and asked for $3.5 million 
in chips, chances are I would have to cough up $3.5 million.604
Zarin was not a circumstance where the taxpayer did not 
obtain the services he paid for.605 He obviously received the 
gambling services he incurred the debt for.606 There was certain-
ly no understanding by the parties that he would be successful 
at it.607 Despite the foregoing, one should not be blindsided to 
what could be viewed as an inequity. Zarin was an unfortunate 
gambler, suffering from an addiction that was likely exploited by 
Resorts, and put in a position of owing the federal government 
millions of dollars on the settlement of his losses.608 While shar-
ing the empathy of many writers for Zarin, this does not mean 
602 Dodge, supra note 19, at 678 (footnote omitted). 
603 Id. at 683. 
604 Schenk, supra note 12, at 166, 166 n.88. 
605 Zarin v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1084, 1099 (1989). 
606 See id.
607 See id.
608 See id. at 1086. 
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the federal tax law should be construed in such a manner as to 
carve out an exception for him, which is not consistent with the 
law with respect to COD income. To remedy what many might 
view as an injustice with respect to future Zarins (assuming the 
Third Circuit opinion is not followed), Congress could, as Profes-
sor Barton suggested,609 amend the Code. In addition to or in 
lieu of carving out a special exception in section 108, this might 
include modifying section 165(d) to allow COD income from set-
tling a gambling related indebtedness to be offset by current or a 
prior year’s (or possibly years’) gambling losses. 
 Finally, a reviewer of an earlier draft of this Article posed 
a hypothetical along the following lines as to how far this writer 
would extend his reasoning with respect to Zarin. A homeowner 
loses his job during the COVID-19 pandemic and his local utility 
company agrees to reduce the customer’s electric bill by $200 
from $300 to $100. Does the customer have $200 of COD in-
come? There is a line of reasoning that he does. That is why not 
treat utility services and gambling services alike? There is, how-
ever, a contrary rationale. As discussed, this writer believes that 
Resorts should be treated as functioning as both a lender, mak-
ing substantial loans, and a provider of gambling services.610
The settlement had the effect of reducing Zarin’s indebtedness to 
his financier, Resorts.611 This is why he should be taxed. The 
utility on the other hand is providing a service that it bills cus-
tomers for after it is furnished, and it merely reduced the cost of 
this service. This is arguably not the equivalent of the two hats 
worn by Resorts in Zarin. There is a legitimate position not to 
treat all service suppliers billing their fees after its provision as 
being characterized as lenders, with the reduction or cancella-
tion of the payable treated as COD income. In most of those cir-
cumstances, there is merit in Professor Dodge’s assertion that 
there should be “no debt-cancellation income where consumption 
is purchased on credit in commerce and the debt is subsequently 
cancelled or settled.”612 This writer would thus not extend his 
609 See Barton, supra note 168, at 782. 
610 See supra notes 555–62 and accompanying text. 
611 See Zarin v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1084, 1088 (1989); Bittker & Thompson, 
supra note 49, at 1165. 
612 See Dodge, supra note 19, at 683. 
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conclusion in Zarin to encompass all situations where a taxpayer’s 
obligation to a service provider is reduced or eliminated.613
CONCLUSION
 While there are plausible arguments to the contrary, 
Zarin should have had been determined to have COD income 
from his settlement with Resorts.614 Zarin was not subject to tax 
when he received the gambling credit because both parties had, 
at the time the indebtedness was incurred, an understanding 
that it would be repaid.615 This tax benefit he received at the 
time of the loans results in COD income upon the indebtedness’ 
settlement for less than what was owed, unless an exception 
applied, and none should have in this case.616
 The loan proceeds methodology, or a variation thereof, is 
the proper means of establishing whether a taxpayer has COD 
income, prior to considering whether any of the exceptions ap-
ply.617 Both the freeing of assets and the Kerbaugh-Empire form
of the whole transaction concepts should no longer be followed 
by the courts.618
613 But see Musselman, supra note 6, at 634–35. Although he would not 
have taxed Zarin on all or at least part of the reduction to his liability, based 
on his tax accountant preparation hypothetical discussed above, he would 
likely treat the $200 as COD income. 
614 See supra Section II.E; supra text accompanying note 569. 
615 See supra notes 98–105 and accompanying text. 
616 See supra notes 98–105 and accompanying text; see also McMahon & 
Simmons, supra note 3, at 437 (“[N]one of the exceptions to section 61(a)(12) 
or section 108 applied.”). 
617 See supra Section II.E. 
618 See Schenk, supra note 12, at 144 (discussing criticism of freeing of as-
sets); see also Bittker & Thompson, supra note 49, at 1162–63 (discussing 
whole transaction theory and why it is defective). 
